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CRIMINAL LAW 
RETHINKING THE USE OF COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION 
CECELIA KLINGELE* 
Community supervision, whether in the form of probation or post-
release supervision, is ordinarily framed as an alternative to incarceration.  
For this reason, legal reformers intent on reducing America’s 
disproportionately high incarceration rates often urge lawmakers to expand 
the use of community supervision, confident that diverting offenders to the 
community will significantly reduce overreliance on incarceration.  Yet, on 
any given day, a significant percentage of new prisoners arrive at the 
prison gates not as a result of sentencing for a new crime, but because they 
have been revoked from probation or parole.  It is therefore fair to say that, 
in many cases, community supervision is not an alternative to imprisonment 
but only a delayed form of it.  This Article examines the reasons why 
community supervision so often fails and challenges popular assumptions 
about the role community supervision should play in efforts to reduce 
overreliance on imprisonment.  While probation and post-release 
supervision serve important purposes in many cases, they are often imposed 
on the wrong people and executed in ways that predictably lead to 
revocation.  To decrease the overuse of imprisonment, sentencing and 
correctional practices should therefore limit, rather than expand, the use of 
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community supervision in three important ways.  First, terms of community 
supervision should be imposed in fewer cases, with alternatives ranging 
from fines to unconditional discharge to short jail terms imposed instead.  
Second, conditions of probation and post-release supervision should be 
imposed sparingly and only when they directly correspond to a risk of 
reoffense.  Finally, terms of community supervision should be limited in 
duration, extending only long enough to facilitate a period of structured 
reintegration after sentencing or following a term of incarceration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the United States has the highest incarceration rate 
in the world.  Between 1977 and 2010, the number of people confined in 
state and federal prisons grew from roughly 300,000 to more than 1.5 
million1—a figure that places the United States seven times ahead of its 
 
1 See LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011); BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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Western European counterparts with respect to incarceration rates.2  The 
cost of mass incarceration, in social, moral, and financial terms, has 
generated considerable recent scholarly and legislative attention.3  Those 
convicted of crimes often face lifelong collateral consequences that limit 
their abilities to vote, gain employment, and participate fully in civic life4—
a reality that limits not only their own prospects, but those of their children 
and communities.5  The widespread reach of the criminal justice system has 
harsh consequences for the state, too.6  Even before the 2008 financial crisis 
dramatically reduced state and county budgets, the rising cost of operating 
correctional facilities had caught the attention of state and local 
policymakers, and in recent years, legislatures have shown growing interest 
in reforms aimed at reducing the costs associated with criminal 
punishment.7 
 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925-85, at 3 tbl.2 (1986). 
2 By global standards, the United States is far and away a leader in imprisonment, 
confining nearly 1 out of every 100 adults.  Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, 
Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 
(2009); see also Alfred Blumstein et al., Cross-National Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME 
& JUST. 347, 348–50, 375 (2005). 
3 In the past decade, there has been a large body of work discussing the direct and 
indirect costs of mass incarceration.  For a sampling, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW 
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); TODD R. CLEAR, 
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO 
REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2005); MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001); NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATE 
EFFORTS IN SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORM 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1110SENTENCINGREFORM.PDF (“If 
states want to reduce corrections costs, they must find ways to reduce prison populations.”); 
Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening 
Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 332 (2002); Jonathan Simon, 
Mass Incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 23 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
4 See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013) (describing the broad range of 
legally authorized collateral consequences). 
5 See generally CLEAR, supra note 3 (discussing the ways in which mass incarceration 
negatively affects families and communities); Joseph Murray et al., Children’s Antisocial 
Behavior, Mental Health, Drug Use, and Educational Performance After Parental 
Incarceration: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 175, 175 
(2012) (reporting that children of incarcerated parents face elevated risks of behavioral 
problems). 
6 See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF 
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 8 fig.3 (2012) (tabulating the cost of 
imprisonment on a per-state basis). 
7 The federal, state, and local governments spend nearly $75 billion annually on costs 
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Reformers interested in reducing imprisonment rates often advocate 
the increased use of noncustodial sanctions.  They have encouraged judges 
to sentence more people to terms of probation and have urged legislatures 
to authorize or expand opportunities for prisoners to obtain conditional 
release at the end of their sentences.8  Imprisonment is juxtaposed against 
community supervision: from this perspective, every sentence of probation 
is a small victory in the battle against mass incarceration and its associated 
costs.  In reality, however, the relationship between incarceration and 
community supervision is complex and interwoven. 
The growth of U.S. prison populations during the latter half of the 
twentieth century has been well documented and much decried,9 but the 
dramatic growth in community supervision that occurred during the same 
period has received far less attention.  Notably, the same period that saw 
dramatic growth in prison populations also saw significant increases in the 
number of people serving terms of community supervision.  Between 1977 
and 2010, the number of individuals on probation more than quadrupled, 
growing from just over 800,000 to more than 4,000,000.10  And, despite 
trends during the period that reduced opportunities for early parole 
release,11 the number of individuals serving terms of supervision following 
incarceration grew from more than 173,000 to nearly 841,000.12 
 
associated with corrections.  JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, 
THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf; see also PEW CTR. 
ON STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 16 (2008) (noting that Vermont, 
Michigan, Oregon, Connecticut, and Delaware—in that order—spend more money annually 
on corrections than on higher education). 
8 See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld et al., The Contribution of Ex-Prisoners to Crime Rates, in 
PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 80, 102–03 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter PRISONER REENTRY] (concluding that “expanded use of discretionary 
parole supervision” would better protect the public from the safety threat posed by released 
prisoners); see also Juliene James et al., A View from the States: Evidence-Based Public 
Safety Legislation, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 841 (2012) (“Using community 
corrections, rather than institutional sentences, has the potential to improve communities.  
Defendants and offenders who are not incarcerated have the opportunity to remain with their 
families, hold on to employment, and participate in treatment or other programming within 
the natural context of their lives, as opposed to the ‘unnatural’ setting of a prison or jail.”). 
9 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 3; CLEAR, supra note 3; JACOBSON, supra note 3. 
10 LAUREN GLAZE & THOMAS BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ADULTS ON PROBATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1977–2010 (2011) [hereinafter 
GLAZE & BONCZAR, ADULTS ON PROBATION], available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=2026. 
11 See Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial 
Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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The average annual per person cost of incarceration is approximately 
fifteen times higher than the cost of community supervision.13  Standing 
alone, that figure suggests that community corrections is a cost-saving 
alternative to incarceration—and community supervision often is less costly 
when it averts the need for a harsher sanction.  The picture becomes more 
complicated, however, when we consider how often terms of community 
supervision lead to terms of imprisonment. 
Estimates suggest that half of the people admitted to U.S. jails, and 
more than one-third of those admitted to prison, arrive there as a result of 
revocation from community supervision.14  While that figure is dramatic in 
its own right, it obscures the wide variance between state revocation rates.  
In states such as New Hampshire,15 North Carolina,16 and Wisconsin,17 
 
465, 480–81 (2010) (discussing the rise of determinate sentencing and its effects on the 
availability of parole release). 
12 See LAUREN GLAZE & THOMAS BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, ADULTS ON PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1975–2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1997. 
13 The cost of incarceration for a federal prisoner averages $28,284 annually, Annual 
Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,081 (Sept. 15, 2011), while 
the cost of confining state prisoners averages $31,286, HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 
6, at 9 (surveying forty states and reporting an average annual cost varying from “$14,603 in 
Kentucky to $60,076 in New York”).  These figures include the “overhead” costs of 
incarceration and not simply the cost of housing, clothing, and feeding a single prisoner.  By 
contrast, the average cost of community supervision is $1,250 for an individual on probation 
and $2,750 for an individual on post-release supervision.  PEW CTR. ON STATES, ONE IN 31: 
THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 12 (2009). 
14 PEGGY BURKE ET AL., PEW CTR. ON STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: 
SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS 1 (2007); see also Alfred 
Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Reentry as a Transient State Between Liberty and 
Recommitment, in PRISONER REENTRY, supra note 8, at 50, 61–62. 
15 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN NEW HAMPSHIRE: ANALYSES & 
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS & INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 4 
(2010), available at http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/divisions/publicinformation/documents/
012010_justice_rein_analyses.pdf (“In 2009, probation and parole revocations for condition 
violations (where there wasn’t a new sentence) together accounted for 57 percent of all 
admissions to state prison.”). 
16 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA: REDUCING 
SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND REINVESTING IN STRATEGIES TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 2 
(2010), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/JR_North_
Carolina_FINAL.pdf (“In 2009, probation revocations accounted for 53 percent of prison 
admissions.”). 
17 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN: ANALYSES & POLICY 
OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 4 (2009), 
available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Wisconsin_Analyses_and_
Policy_Options.pdf (“At the end of 2007, more than half (55 percent) of the people incarcerated in 
state prison were there because they had failed to comply with the conditions of community 
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more than half of new prison admissions result from revocation of 
community supervision, not from conviction for a new crime.  These 
statistics suggest that rather than serving as an alternative, community 
supervision often is no more than a deferred sentence of incarceration. 
Increasingly, state and county governments have begun to notice the 
link between high revocation rates and prison growth.  In response, many 
have enacted new laws aimed at reducing revocation rates by limiting the 
ability of courts and correctional agencies to imprison people who violate 
the conditions of their release.  Early assessments suggest that these legal 
changes have met with some success in reducing the number of revocations 
in adopting jurisdictions.  However, they often have been implemented 
hastily, with the primary goal of reducing the immediate costs associated 
with confinement, rather than examining why rule violations are so 
prevalent, or what kind of limitations on revocation may be justified as a 
matter of principle. 
This Article challenges the conventional thinking that expanding the 
use of community supervision will necessarily mitigate the problem of 
over-incarceration.  It examines why probation and parole—the most 
popular alternatives to incarceration—have become important drivers of 
prison growth and concludes that the best way to reduce prison populations 
is to limit, rather than expand, their use.  While recognizing the continued 
vitality of community supervision as a sentencing option, the Article 
suggests that other alternatives to prison, including conviction alone, fines, 
and even short jail terms, may be preferable sentences in many cases. 
Following this Introduction, Part II reviews the history and 
organizational structure of community supervision in the United States.  
Part III examines the reasons for high revocation rates, ones that are rooted 
in the legal framework that governs community supervision.  Those include 
the conditions that are imposed, the methods of supervision that are utilized, 
and the responses that are available for responding to violations of the terms 
of release.  Part IV discusses several ways in which states have tried to 
reduce high revocation rates.  This section challenges many of the 
principles underlying these efforts, and questions their effectiveness.  Part 
V then introduces a new framework for thinking about the role of 
community supervision in efforts to reduce overreliance on prison.  It 
proposes that the role of supervision should be a limited one—limited in 
terms of the number of people serving terms of release, the conditions to 
which they are made subject, and the periods of time they remain under 
 
supervision or because they had committed a new crime while under supervision.”). 
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state oversight.  Using community supervision in this way will provide for 
wiser stewardship of limited correctional resources and avoid adding to the 
problem of over-incarceration. 
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURES OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 
The term “community supervision” describes the practice of allowing 
a convicted criminal defendant to serve his sentence in the community, 
either as an alternative to incarceration or as part of a transition from prison 
back into ordinary life.  A community sentence that is imposed in lieu of 
imprisonment is called probation; a community supervision term that 
follows a period of imprisonment is most commonly referred to as parole or 
supervised release.18  Regardless of whether a term of community 
supervision is preceded by a prison sentence, it is always structured as a 
form of conditional release: during the period of community supervision, a 
convicted individual must comply with state-imposed conditions in order to 
retain his liberty.  Failure to do so may result in imprisonment. 
Noncustodial sanctions have always been a part of the criminal law.  
Historically, these often took the form of corporal punishments, such as 
flogging or branding, as well as public humiliations, banishment, and 
fines—all sanctions that were imposed quickly and required no ongoing 
oversight from the state.19  Community supervision, with its often lengthy 
periods of state control, is a relatively recent development, originating in 
the mid-1800s and later gaining widespread acceptance and use.20 
In the United States, community supervision varies tremendously from 
one jurisdiction to another.  It goes by different names, is controlled by 
different branches of government, and is subject to legal constraints that are 
far from uniform.21  Any discussion of community supervision must 
therefore begin with a basic examination of the most common forms of 
supervision and the legal and institutional constraints that control their use. 
 
18 Periods of supervision following incarceration go by many different names, including 
post-release supervision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1368.2 (2011), extended supervision, WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 973.01(d) (West 2005), post-prison supervision, OR. REV. STAT. § 144.085(1) 
(2011), and post-release control, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.28 (West 2006). 
19 Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 49, 51–53 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
20 See generally Wilfred Bolster, Adult Probation, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 132 (1914); B. W. Brown, Parole An Institution of the Future, 6 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 65 (1915); Charles A. De Courcy, The Probation System of Massachusetts, 19 
YALE L.J. 187 (1910); Albert H. Hall, Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole, 2 J. 
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832 (1912). 
21 See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1998, at 37–38. 
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Community supervision can be divided into two distinct categories: 
probation and post-release supervision.  Although the conditions governing 
release under both categories tend to be identical, the practices developed 
independently in ways that continue to influence their structures today. 
A. PROBATION 
Probation is a community-based sanction imposed by a court in lieu of 
imprisonment.22  In many jurisdictions, probation is treated as an alternative 
to a formal (i.e., custodial) sentence; in others, it is treated as a sentence in 
its own right.23  It always includes a defined period of conditional release in 
the community, sometimes preceded by a short jail stay.24  Probation is 
conditioned on a convicted person’s compliance with rules, such as 
reporting regularly to a probation officer; attending work, classes, or 
treatment programs; avoiding new criminal conduct; and complying with 
other restrictions designed to promote rehabilitation and contain risk.25  At 
their discretion, supervising probation officers may often add additional 
rules to those imposed by the sentencing courts.26 
Modern probation is usually credited as an American innovation that 
began in the nineteenth century.27  In 1841, a shoemaker and temperance 
 
22 See id. at 30 (defining probation as “[a] court-ordered disposition alternative through 
which an adjudicated offender is placed under the control, supervision and care of a 
probation staff member in lieu of imprisonment, so long as the probationer meets certain 
standards of contact . . . .”).  In some jurisdictions, a short term of imprisonment may be 
imposed as a “condition” of probation or as part of a “split sentence.”  PATRICK A. LANGAN 
& ROBYN L. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1992, at 29 (1996) (reporting that in 1992, 56% of 
felony cases included a combined sentence of probation and jail time). 
23 Compare People v. Daniels, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Although courts sometimes refer to it as a ‘sentence,’ probation is not a sentence even if it 
includes a term in the county jail as a condition.  In granting probation, the court suspends 
imposition or execution of sentence and issues a revocable and conditional release as an act 
of clemency.” (citations omitted)), with State v. Hamlin, 950 P.2d 336, 339 (Or. Ct. App. 
1997) (“With the passage of the sentencing guidelines, . . . [p]robation is no longer the 
suspension of a sentence; probation is the sentence.”). 
24 Using jail in combination with probation is a practice often referred to as a “split 
sentence.”  A 1996 study found that split sentences were used in approximately a quarter of 
felony cases.  Petersilia, supra note 21, at 35. 
25 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1) (2011); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 107. 
26 See infra Part III.A. 
27 Similar practices, including the use of charitable “police court missionaries” whose job 
was to help divert offenders deemed good candidates for rehabilitation, developed in Europe 
during the same period.  Peter Young, A Sociological Analysis of the Early History of 
Probation, 3 BRIT. J.L. & SOC’Y 44, 56 (1976). 
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advocate named John Augustus petitioned the Boston Police Court for 
permission to “sponsor” a man whose crimes would have ordinarily 
resulted in a term of mandatory confinement.28  The court relented, and 
several weeks later, Augustus returned the man to court and proclaimed his 
rehabilitation.29  Persuaded that the man had been reformed, the court 
imposed a nominal fine and sent him on his way.30   
In 1891, Massachussetts passed legislation authorizing the first state 
probation officers, whose job was twofold: first, to investigate the 
circumstances of each person brought before the court so that the judge 
might “know what a man is as well as what he has done”; and second, “to 
take the care of convicted persons who do not need imprisonment, but who 
should not be discharged.”31  Other jurisdictions quickly followed suit, and 
by 1910, thirty-four states had adopted probation laws.32  The federal 
government passed probation legislation in 1925.33 
Probation immediately became a popular disposition.  Surveys from 
the 1950s and ’60s indicate that roughly 40%–50% of convicted criminals 
were sentenced to probation.34  Even as criminal justice policies became 
more punitive during later decades of the twentieth century, the use of 
probation increased: in 2001, 60% of those under correctional supervision 
were serving terms of probation.35  This development is best explained by 
changes in supervisory practices.  Throughout the 1980s and ’90s, 
jurisdictions developed “intensive supervision” programs, imposed more 
 
28 Frank W. Grinnell, The Common Law History of Probation: An Illustration of the 
“Equitable” Growth of Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24–25 (1941). 
29 Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 155 (1997).  
Over the course of following fifteen years, Augustus voluntarily supervised nearly two 
thousand offenders, earning himself the title of the nation’s first probation officer.  Id.; 
Grinnell, supra note 28, at 25.  In his autobiography, Augustus reported significant success 
helping those in his care, most of whom had violated temperance laws.  See generally JOHN 
AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS, IN AID 
OF THE UNFORTUNATE (Boston, Wright & Hasty 1852). 
30 Petersilia, supra note 29, at 155. 
31 The Massachusetts Probation System, Its Administration and Operation, 10 
PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS’N 236, 236–37 (1907) [hereinafter Mass. Prob. Sys.].  Those 
dual roles continue to be served by probation officers today, who conduct presentence 
investigations and provide direct oversight to those placed on community supervision. 
32 De Courcy, supra note 20, at 191. 
33 Joel R. Moore, “The United States Probation System,” 23 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 638, 639 (1932). 
34 Heinz R. Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to 
Probation, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1962). 
35 Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 171, 191 (2003). 
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restrictive conditions, and increased rates of revocation.36  Although these 
changes allowed probation to remain consistent with the ethos of the times, 
they moved it far from its simple and minimalist roots, turning it into a 
much more formal sanction than the probation Augustus pioneered. 
By 2011, 3,971,300 people were serving terms of probation.37  
Probation is often a sanction of first resort for offenders convicted of minor 
crimes and for youthful or first-time offenders.  It is also, however, a 
common disposition for repeat offenders and for those convicted of many 
nonviolent felony offenses.38 
As its history suggests, probation was originally a way to “keep less 
serious and/or first [time] offenders from undergoing the corrupting effects 
of jail terms.”39  Early advocates lauded probation as “one of the highest 
forms of social service work,” designed to assist the wayward in 
recommitting themselves to a law-abiding life.40 
While rehabilitation remains a goal of probation, its purposes have 
become more complicated.  Early in its history, probation became a tool not 
only for reform, but for manipulation of the criminal process: prosecutors 
then and now used the promise of probation to induce guilty pleas from 
defendants, for reasons good and ill.41  From the perspective of the offender, 
probation offers an opportunity to avoid a term of imprisonment and 
maintain work, familial relationships, and access to community programs.  
From the perspective of the state, it provides a chance to connect offenders 
with needed services, while also allowing agents to keep tabs on convicted 
individuals who are not dangerous or culpable enough to require 
imprisonment, but who nonetheless require some state intervention as a 
result of their criminal conduct.  How these purposes should be ordered in 
any given case is a matter that has received inadequate study. 
 
36 Id. at 192–93; see also Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and 
Parole, 17 CRIME & JUST. 281, 282–83 (1993). 
37 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1–2 (2012). 
38 Cf. Petersilia, supra note 29, at 149 (“Probation is the most common form of criminal 
sentencing in the United States.”). 
39 Ralph W. England, Jr., What is Responsible for Satisfactory Probation and Post-
Probation Outcome?, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 667, 675 (1957). 
40 Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., Probation Progress, 23 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 915, 920 (1933). 
41 Logan, supra note 35, at 178; see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND 
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 78 (1980). 
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The power to impose probation was originally understood as an 
outgrowth of the court’s power to suspend sentences.42  But even after 
statutes began to authorize probation as a freestanding sanction, the 
decision whether to place a convicted individual on probation remained 
vested in the discretion of the court.  It is not surprising, therefore, that in 
many jurisdictions, probation officers were treated as officers of the court, 
appointed by judges and reporting to them directly.43  Over time, efforts to 
professionalize the rehabilitative role of the probation officer led to the 
development of more centralized administrative structures in some 
jursidictions, in which probation officers reported violations to the court but 
were employed as civil servants and served under independent probation 
commissions, boards of charity, or other independent state agencies.44 
The structures in which probation officers operate have continued to 
diversify.  One study identified more than 2,000 probation agencies in the 
United States, each with unique characteristics shaped by local culture and 
practice.45  Today, “probation services . . . differ in terms of whether they 
are delivered by the executive or the judicial branch of government, how 
services are funded, and whether probation services are primarily a state or 
a local function.”46 
 
42 Prior to the adoption of formal probation legislation, courts justified the power to 
impose probation as part of their discretionary power to suspend a sentence prior to the time 
of conviction.  See G.C.D., Comment on Recent Cases, Criminal Law: Power to Suspend 
Sentence, 4 CAL. L. REV. 144, 144 (1916).  After conviction, courts ordinarily lost 
jurisdiction over the sentence within a short period of time.  See Klingele, supra note 11, at 
499–501.  Consequently, the court’s ability to delay execution of the sentence was originally 
confined to the preconviction period.  Federal courts, however, rejected the idea that judges 
could indefinitely suspend sentences in the absence of authorizing legislation.  Ex parte 
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 44 (1916).  Thus, probation was often imposed before 
conviction, though exceptions can be readily found.  The modern use of conditional deferred 
adjudication harkens back to this same practice of preconviction “probation.”  Some state 
statutes still authorize probation as a preconviction disposition.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
276, § 87 (1974) (“The superior court . . . may place on probation in the care of its probation 
officer any person before it charged with an offense or a crime for such time and upon such 
conditions as it deems proper, with the defendant’s consent, before trial and before a plea of 
guilty, or in any case after a finding or verdict of guilty . . . .”); see also Sam B. Warner & 
Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty 
Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 598 (1937) (discussing changes in the use of the suspended 
sentence in the context of probation). 
43 Charles L. Chute, State Supervision of Probation, 8 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 823, 827 (1918). 
44 See id. 
45 Petersilia, supra note 29, at 169 (citing HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1997)). 
46 Id.  While some probation offices function as arms of the sentencing court, in some 
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B. POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION 
In many important ways, post-release community supervision is 
similar to probation.  Individuals leaving prison to serve a term of post-
release supervision are required to comply with conditions that are largely 
identical to those imposed on probationers.  Like probation, post-release 
supervision is designed to serve both rehabilitative and surveillance 
purposes, providing individuals with access to programs and other supports, 
while imposing restrictions designed to improve public safety and increase 
the detection of new crime.  Despite these similarities, post-release 
supervision is often administered in ways that differ importantly from 
probation and that can be traced to its distinct historical origins. 
Unlike probation, post-release supervision did not originate in the 
courts.  Alexander Maconochie, a British naval captain-turned-penologist, 
is often credited with “inventing” parole.47  While serving as director of a 
British penal colony on Norfolk Island during the 1840s, Maconochie 
devised and implemented a graduated system of release, in which inmates 
earned increased freedom through good behavior and other evidence of 
rehabilitation.48  In 1854, Sir Walter Crofton, then head of the Irish penal 
system, adopted a version of Maconochie’s system in his own country.  
Crofton added the practice of conditionally releasing prisoners, subject to 
continued rehabilitation (as evidenced by employment and desistance from 
future crime).49 
The perceived success of these British and Irish “ticket of leave” 
systems, as they were called, led American reformers to call for their 
adoption in the United States.50  New York became the first state to 
formally do so when the Elmira Reformatory opened in 1876.51  The 
Reformatory, which implemented the ticket of leave system, awarded 
“marks” for good behavior that culminated in release from the institution.52  
 
jurisdictions, probation officers are employed by corrections departments, or even county 
governments.  See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 255 (McKinney 1993); N.Y.C. DEP’T PROB., History of 
Probation, http://www.nyc.gov/html/prob/html/about/history.shtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). 
47 LEANNE FIFTAL ALARID ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS 235–36 (7th ed. 2008). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 237. 
50 JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN PRISONS 63–64 (1997). 
51 Id.; Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the 
State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 431 (2011). 
52 ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 65. 
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Other states soon followed, adopting parole along with various forms of the 
indeterminate sentence. 
In New York, and later in other states, a prisoner who exhibited good 
conduct was permitted to leave the prison under the supervision of a 
guardian (usually a family member or employer), who would vouch for the 
person’s good conduct during the period immediately following release.53  
After a period ranging from a few months to a few years, the individual 
would be fully discharged.54  By 1942, all states and the federal government 
had adopted parole legislation.55 
As with probation, over time the practice of parole became more 
structured and institutionalized.  Release became less dependent on the 
warden’s determination that a prisoner had behaved well and more 
dependent on the assessment of a parole board that a prisoner had been 
“rehabilitated.”56  Formal state agents were hired to conduct pre-release 
investigations and provide more formal oversight of parolees’ behavior in 
the community, though their effectiveness varied.57 
Beginning in the 1970s, widespread disillusionment with the state’s 
ability to rehabilitate prisoners led to the restriction of discretionary parole 
in many jurisdictions.58  In 1987, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984 abolished parole for federal defendants,59 and by the turn of the 
century, sixteen states had eliminated parole for all newly convicted 
prisoners.60  Many others passed laws restricting discretionary parole.61 
 
53 Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 431; see also 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 660 (“No 
prisoner shall be paroled until some employment or situation has been secured for such 
prisoner and it shall satisfactorily appear to such board of control that such employment or 
position is suitable in every way and will continue for a period of at least one year.”). 
54 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 659–61. 
55 Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 431; see also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS 
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 58 (2003). 
56 Cf. Klingele, supra note 11, at 473. 
57 See HELEN LELAND WITMER, ADULT PAROLE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO WISCONSIN 
119–22 (May 5, 1925) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison) 
(on file with University of Wisconsin–Madison Library) (discussing the job of early 
Wisconsin parole agents and noting that their ability to fulfill their investigatory and 
supervisory duties with respect to parolees was taxed by limited education and resources). 
58 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 432–34; see also Klingele, supra note 11, at 473–81. 
59 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 2027–30 (1984) (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 4205 
(repealed 1984)). 
60 See Klingele, supra note 11, at 481.  Many of these states replaced discretionary 
parole with other forms of post-release supervision, and several states that abolished early 
release entirely later reinstated it. 
61 Id. 
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Although post-release supervision was restricted, it was not abolished.  
Many states retained discretionary parole for offenders convicted of less 
serious offenses or for those who had served a designated portion (usually 
85%) of their custodial sentences.62  In addition, many states gave judges 
the ability to impose terms of conditional release to follow upon the 
completion of custodial sentences.63  In some states, a period of post-release 
supervision was made mandatory.64 
The result is that, in most jurisdictions, despite changes in release 
practices, a significant number of people leave prison to begin  sentences of 
community supervision.  In 2009, nearly three out of every four individuals 
released from prison were subject to a term of post-release community 
supervision.65  In 2010, more than 840,000 individuals were serving a state 
or federal sentence of post-release supervision.66 
As with probation, the purposes of post-release supervision have 
changed over time, or have at least become more complex.  Initially, and to 
some degree still today, post-release supervision was designed to assist 
already-rehabilitated offenders in their transitions from prison to 
community life.67  The same cultural shifts that led to restrictions on 
discretionary releases from prison during the 1980s and 1990s also led to a 
shift in focus among post-release supervision agents, away from a casework 
model and toward a crime control model.68  High profile crimes committed 
by parolees placed political pressure on legislatures and correctional 
agencies to tighten restrictions on conditional release and react harshly to 
 
62 Id. at 480–81. 
63 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 434. 
64 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1341 (2009) (setting forth guidelines for the 
imposition of supervised release terms on individuals convicted of qualifying offenses); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 504-A:15 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring a minimum of nine months’ 
supervision for all prisoners prior to completion of a prison sentence); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 973.01(1)–(2) (West 2005) (requiring all sentences of imprisonment to include bifurcated 
terms of confinement and “extended supervision”). 
65 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 434. 
66 See GLAZE & BONCZAR, supra note 12. 
67 Under the discretionary parole schemes that were pervasive from 1900 to roughly 
1980, individuals were released upon a finding of rehabilitation by the parole board.  See 
Klingele, supra note 11, at 471–72. 
68 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. CMTY. SUPERVISION & DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, 
PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, AND COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 36 (2008); Paul Cromwell, 
The Evolving Role of Parole in the Criminal Justice System, in CRIME & JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 
PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 405, 411 (Wilson R. Palacios et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
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any violations.69  In many agencies, surveillance became the primary 
purpose of post-release supervision, and tolerance for violations decreased. 
These “law enforcement” influences have often found themselves in 
tension with a growing appreciation for the importance of helping prisoners 
navigate the difficult transition from prison to community—a process that 
has come to be known as reentry.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, studies 
revealed that up to one-half of prisoners were being rearrested within three 
years of release from custody, with most of the failure occurring within the 
first six months.70  Later research provided a rich picture of the challenges 
confronting those leaving prison.71  These studies were so compelling that 
they led Congress to pass legislation authorizing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in funding for programs and research to improve outcomes for 
people leaving jails and prisons,72 a significant portion of which was 
distributed to departments of corrections and other community supervision 
agencies to assist them in their efforts to connect former offenders to social 
services and employment opportunities.73 
The tension between the casework and surveillance-oriented roles of 
post-release supervision officers is inherent and unlikely to be resolved any 
time soon.  Like probation officers, post-release supervision officers are 
 
69 See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME 
& JUST. 479, 479–80 (1999) (discussing public demand for parole abolition following the 
high-profile murder of thirteen-year-old Polly Klaas and the legislative response). 
70 See Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 
421 (2012). 
71 See generally FAYE S. TAXMAN ET AL., FROM PRISON SAFETY TO PUBLIC SAFETY: 
INNOVATIONS IN OFFENDER REENTRY (2002) (presenting a conceptual model of the offender 
reentry process); JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST., BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005) (describing the housing, employment, and other 
challenges facing returning prisoners); JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FAMILIES LEFT 
BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the 
negative effects of incarceration on prisoners’ children and extended families), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left_behind.pdf; Christopher Uggen & Jeff 
Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the 
United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2002) (finding that felon disenfranchisement has 
substantially affected U.S. Senate elections and that at least one Republican presidential victory 
would have been reversed if former felons had been allowed to vote); Christy A. Visher, 
Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About Prisoner Reentry, 20 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 93 (2007) (generally describing the challenges of reentry). 
72 See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
73 In 2011, departments of corrections throughout the country received funding through 
the Second Chance Act Reentry Program for Adult Offenders with Co-Occurring Substance 
Disorders and other grant funding.  See Office of Justice Programs Announces 2011 Grant 
Awards, ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, http://www.asca.net/articles/1733 (last visited Aug. 
9, 2013) (linking to spreadsheets that list grant recipients for Second Chance funding). 
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asked to wear many hats, sometimes simultaneously.  Former 
Massachussetts Probation Chief Ron Corbett spoke for all community 
corrections officers when he offered this anecdote: 
When I was asked at a meeting of probation officers, “Are we supposed to be cops or 
social workers?[”]  I answered with another question—“How many of you are parents 
to teenagers?”  I asked those that raised their hands, “Would you say you were a cop 
or social worker?”  One of those that raised his hand said, “At different times, I was 
both.”  Bingo . . . .74 
For community corrections agents, the question is not whether 
rehabilitation and surveillance are legitimate purposes of supervision; 
rather, the question is how to balance the competing demands they make on 
agents’ time and the criminal justice system’s limited resources.  The 
answer is often shaped by the culture of the agencies in which post-release 
officers perform their work. 
Before the 1980s, post-release supervision was primarily the job of 
parole officers employed by departments of corrections or independent 
parole boards.  With the advent of determinate sentencing and the decline of 
discretionary parole, parole agencies underwent a significant shift.  No 
longer responsible for managing discretionary parolees, parole officers still 
remained responsible for supervising mandatory parolees and individuals 
with newly imposed terms of post-imprisonment community supervision.  
These newly coined “community corrections” officers often remained 
aligned with correctional agencies or independent parole boards, though 
sometimes they merged with probation offices to supervise individuals on 
both probation and post-release supervision.  As a result, post-release 
supervision officers now operate in a wide variety of institutional contexts, 
sometimes reporting directly to courts (as in the federal system) and other 
times operating within correctional agency structures.75 
III. THE DYNAMICS OF REVOCATION 
By definition, sentences of community supervision are intended to be 
noncustodial.  In many jurisdictions, however, community supervision often 
ends in confinement.  One study followed individuals released from prison 
in 2004 and found that in thirteen states, 25% or more of those released 
were reincarcerated for purely “technical” violations76 of community 
 
74 Tricia M. Oliver, A Q&A with Ron Corbett, Probation Commissioner, 18 MASS. 
LAWYERS J. 1, 10 (2011). 
75 See Part III infra. 
76 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-5214, 75-5216 (1981), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-136, 
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supervision within three years.77  Recent estimates suggest that half of the 
people in U.S. jails, and more than one-third of those entering prison, have 
been incarcerated as a result of revocation.78  While revocation rates vary 
tremendously from one jurisdiction to another and are not perfectly 
recorded (particularly with respect to probation), it is clear that in many 
jurisdictions the failure of community supervision accounts for a dramatic 
portion of new prison admissions. 
Furthermore, rates of success appear to have decreased over time.  One 
study estimated that successful probation completion rates “declined from 
69% in 1990 to 59% in 2005,” while successful parole completion declined 
from 50% to 45% in the same period.79  Consistent with that finding, a 2009 
report found that 40% of new California prison admissions annually come 
as a result of probation revocation alone.80 
Why does community supervision end so often in imprisonment?  The 
answer can be found in the legal and institutional structures that control the 
imposition and execution of communty supervision.  These include the 
number and kind of rules on which release is conditioned, the methods of 
supervision employed by community corrections agents, and the legal 
framework that governs the state’s response to violations of community 
supervision. 
 
53.1-145 (2013), WIS. STAT. §§ 301.001, 304.01 (2009), WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 328.04 
(2013).  A technical violation is a breach of the rules of release that is not in itself criminal.  
Violating curfew, drinking alcohol, missing appointments, or having contact with prohibited 
individuals are all examples of technical violations. 
77 PEW CTR. ON STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 
14 ex.2 (2011) (listing California, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin as reincarcerating 25% or 
more of releasees for technical violations).  Because the study included all released prisoners and 
not just those released to serve terms of community supervision, the actual percentage of 
individuals revoked in each of the named jurisdictions was likely much higher than 25%. 
78 BURKE ET AL., supra note 14, at 1; see also id. at 3 (“[S]hifts in practices with respect 
to parole release and reincarceration for parole violations accounted for 60 percent of the 
increase in the nation’s prison population between 1992 and 2001.”); Blumstein & Beck, in  
PRISONER REENTRY, supra note 8, at 56. 
79 Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of 
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 
593 (2009); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 
6, 9 (rev. 2008). 
80 See, e.g., Achieving Better Outcomes for Adult Probation, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE 
(May 29, 2009), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.aspx; see also 
PEW CTR. ON STATES, THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S PROBATION PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE 
FUNDING PROGRAM 1 (2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Pew_California_probation_brief.pdf. 
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A. CONDITIONS OF RELEASE 
Community supervision, whether in the form of probation or post-
release supervision, is often framed as a benevolent alternative to legally 
authorized confinement.81  Because community supervision is imposed only 
in cases in which confinement is a permitted sanction, reviewing courts 
have tended to treat the imposition of probation or post-release supervision 
conditions as an “act of grace” that permits convicted individuals to serve 
“lighter” sentences than the law permits.82  Laws governing the imposition 
of release conditions are broadly permissive: courts and correctional 
agencies may legally impose almost any condition on a probationer or 
parolee on the grounds that any conceivable term of release will be less 
punitive than the authorized term of confinement.  Individuals who are 
subjected to particularly onerous conditions of supervision may challenge 
them as impermissibly infringing on constitutional rights;83 however, courts 
typically treat such rights as “diminished” during the period of 
supervision.84  Thus, for reasons both practical and legal, conditions of 
release “are rarely subjected to any appellate review.”85  When they do face 
review, it tends to be “extremely deferential.”86 
There is wide variety in the number and kind of conditions that are 
imposed on individuals under community supervision.  In many 
jurisdictions, all sentences of community supervision include mandatory 
 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) (“The great desideratum 
[of the Federal Probation Act] was the giving to young and new violators of law a chance to 
reform and to escape the contaminating influence of association with hardened or veteran 
criminals in the beginning of the imprisonment.”). 
82 Often called the “act of grace theory,” this finds its origins in Burns v. United States, 
287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932), and Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492–93 (1935) (“Probation or 
suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime . . . .”).  See 
Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness 
is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 55–56 (1981); see also Andrew Horwitz, 
Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial 
Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 88–90 (2000) (discussing act-
of-grace theory). 
83 Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 202–07 
(1967); see also Hink, supra note 34, at 489–90. 
84 See Jasmine S. Wynton, Note, MySpace, YourSpace, But Not TheirSpace: The 
Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1859, 1886 (2011) (“Offenders on probation, parole, or supervised release have diminished 
constitutional rights and thus receive less constitutional protection than those who are no 
longer under state supervision.”). 
85 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 82, at 110. 
86 Id. 
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conditions to which all offenders are subject.  Most common among these is 
the requirement that no new crimes be committed; others include reporting 
regularly to the supervising agent and making restitution payments.87  The 
weight of these standard conditions can be significant.88 
In addition to generally applicable standard conditions, courts may be 
required to impose additional mandatory rules on certain categories of 
offenders.  Under federal law, all individuals convicted of crimes of 
domestic abuse must attend an approved rehabilitation program, for 
example.89  Sex offenders are often singled out for extra conditions, which 
may include registration, around-the-clock GPS monitoring, limits on 
access to the Internet, and chemical castration.90 
In addition to mandatory conditions, courts are authorized to impose 
additional conditions of supervision at their discretion.91  Most states 
 
87 Heather Barklage et al., Probation Conditions Versus Probation Officer Directives: Where 
the Twain Shall Meet, 70 FED. PROBATION 37, 37 (2006) (“Currently, both federal and state 
probation and parole systems utilize what are known as ‘standard conditions of supervision.’  
These ‘standard’ conditions routinely require the offender to: 1) avoid commission of any new 
offenses; 2) notify the supervising agency prior to leaving the district of supervision; 3) notify the 
supervising agency of any change in residence; 4) maintain stable employment; 5) report any new 
arrests without delay to the supervising agency; 6) report regularly to the supervising agency; and 
7) to comply with any directives or instructions from the supervising corrections agent.”). 
88 See, e.g., Ben M. Crouch, Is Incarceration Really Worse? Analysis of Offenders’ 
Preferences for Prison Over Probation, 10 JUST. Q. 67, 79 (1993) (finding that two-thirds of 
Texas prisoners surveyed would prefer a year in prison to ten years of probation, and nearly 
one-third would prefer one year in prison to three years of probation).  In the federal system, 
individuals serving terms of probation must comply with seven standard conditions, any one of 
which could result in revocation (and sometimes a new criminal charge, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
(2012), if not performed, id. § 3563(a) (listing mandatory probation conditions that include 
committing no new crimes, paying fines and restitution, avoiding drug use, performing drug 
tests, notifying the court of changes in economic conditions, and providing a DNA sample)). 
89 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(4). 
90 Id. § 3563(a)(8) (“The court shall provide, as an explicit condition of a sentence of 
probation . . . for a person required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, that the person comply with the requirements of that Act[.]”); Michael 
Petrunik et al., American and Canadian Approaches to Sex Offenders: A Study of the Politics 
of Dangerousness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 111, 115 (2008) (“California was the first state to 
pass legislation mandating chemical castration through antiandrogen treatment as a parole 
condition for certain categories of sex offender, followed by Florida in 1997.”); Richard G. 
Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 36–38 (2008).  Sex offender conditions are so restrictive 
that some departments have established special units to provide supervision to sex offenders.  
See Madeline Carter et al., Promoting Offender Accountability and Community Safety 
through the Comprehensive Approach to Sex Offender Management, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1273, 1292–93 (2004).  Officers working in these units ordinarily carry a smaller caseload to 
enable them to provide more careful supervision.  Id. 
91 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (listing twenty-two discretionary conditions, and 
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explicitly authorize sentencing courts to impose additional conditions.92  As 
a consequence, courts have been known to impose a wide range of 
conditions, ranging from the bizarre (“[y]ou may never even sit in the front 
seat (of a car)”93) to the controversial (don’t get pregnant94) to the 
downright dangerous (put a bumper sticker on your car announcing you are 
a sex offender95).96  Even when the conditions imposed are reasonable in 
themselves, the lack of robust legal limits on release conditions often results 
in a laundry list of conditions to which any given offender is bound.97  
Historically, individuals on community supervision were required to 
“be of good behavior” and “conduct [themselves] in a law-abiding 
manner.”98  Such vague directives have given way to more specific rules, 
but the broad flavor of the original admonitions remains.  Some conditions 
that attach to community supervision impose restrictions that are tied to the 
offender’s known risks, such as prohibitions on weapons for violent 
offenders, drug use for those with substance abuse related convictions, and 
socializing with codefendants or convicted felons for those whose criminal 
 
authorizing “such other conditions as the court may impose”). 
92 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(a) (2011) (“The court may impose conditions of 
probation reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to 
assist him to do so.”). 
93 Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, Front-Seat Ban Adds to Odd Legacy of Judge Schellinger, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 2003, at 1B. 
94 Dan Slater, The Judge Says: Don’t Get Pregnant.  A Lapsed Law Now Sees New Life, 
WALL ST. J., September 25, 2008, at A18, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122230566090673847.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
95 See Ross E. Milloy, Texas Judge Orders Notices Warning of Sex Offenders: Car and 
Home Signs Elicit Praise and Shock, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at A10 (reporting that after 
“a judge ordered 21 registered sex criminals to post signs on their homes and automobiles 
warning the public of their crimes, [] the results were almost immediate.  One of the 
offenders attempted suicide, two were evicted from their homes, several had their property 
vandalized and one offender’s father had his life threatened, according to court testimony.”). 
96 For critiques of these and other conditions that purport to shame and “creatively” 
punish, see generally Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical 
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357 (challenging the 
justifications for extreme shaming sanctions). 
97 A study of individuals on conditional release in Wisconsin revealed an average of 
thirty conditions per offender, approximately half of which were discretionary.  KIT VAN 
STELLE & JANAE GOODRICH, UNIV. WIS. POPULATION HEALTH INST., THE 2008/2009 STUDY 
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION 158 (2009), available at http://uwphi.pophealth.
wisc.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/2008-2009-study-of-probation-and-parole-revocation.pdf. 
98 Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 315 n.31 (1959) 
(quoting State v. McBride, 83 S.E.2d 488, 490 (N.C. 1954); Swan v. State, 90 A.2d 690, 693 
(Md. 1952)). 
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activity has been influenced by their gang affiliations.99  Other conditions, 
however, govern aspects of life that are not in themselves criminal or even 
immoral.  Supervision rules commonly impose curfews, prohibit alcohol 
consumption, and require participation in educational programs.  Additional 
administrative conditions may require offenders to attend meetings with 
community corrections officers (often at a distance from the offenders’ 
homes), pay restitution and fees for supervision and required treatment 
programs, submit monthly financial forms with supporting documentation, 
obtain permission before traveling outside the jurisdiction, and notify the 
agent immediately of any change in residence or employment. 
While often reasonable when considered individually, in the aggregate, 
the sheer number of requirements imposes a nearly impossible burden on 
many offenders.100  Not surprisingly then, violations of the conditions of 
community supervision are pervasive.  Many are minor, but because all 
conditions are court-imposed as a condition of release, even the slightest 
infraction gives the state legal authority to imprison the violator.  And, as 
one agent observed, uncovering evidence of minor violations is not 
difficult: 
[M]ost of our violations are technical. . . .  I mean, if you can’t write up a report, and 
cite at least a technical violation, you’re not really struggling very hard, because there 
are so many conditions.  There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right, 
right?101 
For those serving terms of probation, release conditions are ordinarily 
imposed by the sentencing court.102  Individuals serving terms of post-
release supervision may be subject to court-imposed conditions,103 to 
conditions set by the releasing agency,104 or to a combination of both.105   
 
99 One study of probationers found that in 1995, two out of five “probationers were 
required to enroll in some form of substance abuse treatment. . . .  Nearly a third of all 
probationers were subject to mandatory drug testing . . . .”  THOMAS P. BONZCAR, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULTS ON PROBATION, 
1995, at 7 (1997). 
100 The likelihood of violation is high in any case, but the odds are heightened by the fact 
that individuals involved in the criminal justice system are more likely to be drug-addicted, 
economically disadvantaged, suffering from physical and mental ailments, and are more 
likely to have learning and language deficits. 
101 Interview with Correctional Agent (July 25, 2012).  The identity of agents 
interviewed for this project are protected as confidential under the terms of University of 
Wisconsin–Madison IRB Protocol SE-2012-0220. 
102 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.553 (West 2011). 
103 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012). 
104 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 947.1405 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.12175 (1997); see 
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2967.01(E), 2967.131 (West 2000). 
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Even when courts, rather than agencies, are responsible for setting rules, 
correctional agents often implement those rules in ways that add to (or 
subtract from) the burdens they place on those subject to them.  Federal and 
state courts have tried to limit the degree to which correctional officers may 
assume the “core judicial function” of imposing and modifying rules of 
release, but as a practical matter, some delegation takes place out of 
necessity, as agents give meaning to vague conditions, such as orders to 
“meet with the agent,” “submit to drug testing,” or “pay restitution.”106  
When to meet, how often to test, and how much to pay are questions that 
agents often play an important role in answering.107  Consequently, agents’ 
methods of supervising and implementing conditions become important 
components of understanding the dynamics of revocation.  
B. METHODS OF SUPERVISION 
Supervision styles are tremendously varied and are heavily influenced 
by office culture.  In some jurisdictions, particularly those in which agents 
carry heavy caseloads, officers have become little more than glorified 
bureaucrats who spend their days completing paperwork and conducting 
periodic check-ins with offenders in the agents’ offices.108  In other places, 
officers spend most of their time in the field, visiting offenders in their 
homes and at their places of work.  Some agents have offices in the 
 
105 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 439.177, 439.3108. 
106 See Barklage et al., supra note 87, at 38–39. 
[T]he crux of the problem is the extent to which the probation officers’ instructions or directives 
require the defendant to adhere to new requirements of supervision about which he did not have 
reasonable notice.  Too much limitation of the community supervisor’s discretion is obviously 
problematic, for it will render the agent unable to respond to changing conditions in an 
offender’s circumstances.  On the other hand, courts cannot abandon their constitutional and 
statutory sentencing roles by granting plenary powers to correctional personnel. 
Id. at 40; see also United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995); Whitehead v. 
United States, 155 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 1946) (“Fixing the terms and conditions of 
probation is a judicial act which may not be delegated.”). 
107 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN KANSAS: ANALYSES 
& POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS & REINVEST IN STRATEGIES TO 
INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY 5 (2013) (“Two out of every three community corrections directors 
surveyed said that judges sentencing someone to probation typically provide the probation 
officer with the discretion to increase reporting requirements or impose a curfew without 
having to go back to court first.”). 
108 See Mark Jones & John J. Kerbs, Probation and Parole Officers and Discretionary 
Decision-Making: Responses to Technical and Criminal Violations, 71 FED. PROBATION 9, 
12 (2007) (reporting survey findings that probation and parole officers carried an average 
caseload of 141 offenders and a maximum caseload of 4,000 offenders). 
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communities where the people they supervise live; others are located in 
central administration centers located at a significant distance from the 
places where probationers and parolees reside.  
For reasons that should be apparent, the more distance officers have 
from the lives of the people they supervise, the more enforcement-oriented 
they tend to be.  Conversely, the more immersed agents are in the 
complicated and difficult lives of the people they supervise, the more they 
tend to embrace a casework model of supervision, seeing themselves more 
as service brokers than as law enforcement officers.  While some of the 
difference in supervision styles can be attributed to differences in 
personality and training among officers,109 studies suggest that institutional 
structures and incentives heavily influence the model of supervision agents 
follow.110  
Agents learn about violations from several common sources: failed 
drug tests, calls from collateral contacts, and many times, from the 
offenders themselves.  Objective sources of information, such as drug test 
results and data provided by electronic monitoring, allow agents to obtain 
information about rule violations even when they have little contact with 
those in their charge.  To gain information from other sources, agents are 
often required to develop relationships of trust with those they supervise, as 
well as their families and associates.111  When such relationships are left 
unattended, violations may go undetected, leading to fewer revocations, 
perhaps, but also to the possibility of serious threats to public safety.  
While positive relationships between offenders and agents is a factor 
that has been correlated with reduced rates of recidivism,112 too much 
 
109 See Lloyd E. Ohlin et al., Major Dilemmas of the Social Worker in Probation and 
Parole, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 211, 215 (1956) (discussing the role of personality in agent 
decisionmaking). 
110 See generally Richard McCleary, How Structural Variables Constrain the Parole 
Officer’s Use of Discretionary Powers, 23 SOC. PROBS. 209 (1975) (examining the structural 
dynamics of revocation decisions). 
111 The same agent quoted above observed that the most common way he learned about 
rule violations was from offenders’ “girlfriends, ex-girlfriends, family, [or] friends.”  
Interview with Correctional Agent (July 25, 2012).  One of the agent’s colleagues reported 
that offenders themselves serve as a primary source of information: “[S]ometimes I get a 
call, and this is actually most of the time, I’ll get a text from the person . . . .  Texting is 
great, because [a rule violation is] not something they’re going to call you with.  It’s much 
easier for them to admit to me that way, for whatever reason . . . .  So, yeah, I’ll learn straight 
from my client.”  Interview with Correctional Agent (Jan. 7, 2013).  These sources of 
information would be less readily available to agents who did not make themselves 
accessible to offenders and their family members or develop trust with them. 
112 See, e.g., Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., When a Person Isn’t a Data Point: 
Making Evidence-Based Practice Work, 76 FED. PROBATION 11, 16 (2012).  See generally 
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supervision can result in higher rates of revocation.  Studies have suggested 
that, contrary to expectations, socially disadvantaged offenders who are 
offered rehabilitative interventions, such as counseling or drug treatment, 
are often more likely to be revoked than are those who are not offered 
treatment services.113  Researchers have attributed this result to the higher 
level of visibility and surveillance that attach to state-imposed 
interventions, however benevolent their design: in short, more conditions 
tend to mean more opportunities for violation and detection.114  
C. RESPONSES TO RULE VIOLATIONS 
When violations have been detected—as they so often are—methods 
of sanctioning vary as much as the conditions themselves and depend 
heavily on the discretionary decisions of multiple actors within the criminal 
justice system.  Violations may be handled informally by the supervising 
community corrections officer.  This form of street-level diversion is often 
left wholly to the discretion of the individual officer but is sometimes 
formally sanctioned by law.115  If the agent decides more formal action must 
be taken, then a sanction is imposed at the agent’s discretion or in 
consultation with a supervisor.  The most serious response is to refer the 
case for full or partial revocation.  For violations of probation, this will 
usually mean returning to the sentencing court,116 while for violations of 
 
JAMES BONTA & D. A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER 
ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION (2007) (discussing the importance of client relationships 
as one aspect of reducing recidivism). 
113 Celesta A. Albonetti & John R. Hepburn, Probation Revocation: A Proportional 
Hazards Model of the Conditioning Effects of Social Disadvantage, 44 SOC. PROBS. 124, 135 
(1997) (“Findings from the pooled proportional hazards model indicate that, contrary to 
expectations, offenders who received both treatment and drug testing, compared to only drug 
testing, did less well on probation.”); see also Todd R. Clear & Patricia L. Hardyman, The 
New Intensive Supervision Movement, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 42, 44–45 (1990); Kenneth C. 
Land et al., Logistic Versus Hazards Regression Analyses in Evaluation Research: An 
Exposition and Application to the North Carolina Court Counselors’ Intensive Protective 
Supervision Project, 18 EVALUATION REV. 411, 424 (1994). 
114 Albonetti & Hepburn, supra note 113, at 135. 
115 See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE DEP’T OF CORR. § 10.01.06 (2007) (“Alternatives to 
Revocation (ATR) shall be considered in all cases.  Alternatives can be formal or informal in 
nature.”). 
116 Wisconsin is an exception, authorizing administrative law judges to hear revocation 
petitions in most cases.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.03 (2009) (“[T]he decision to revoke 
probation, extended supervision or parole in cases in which there is no waiver of the right to 
a hearing shall be made by the division of hearings and appeals in the department of 
administration”). 
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post-release supervision, an adminstrative agency is usually designated as 
the decisionmaker.  
At the agent level, the response to a rule violation will depend a great 
deal on the proclivities of the supervising agent117 and the circumstances of 
the infraction.  Minor violations, such as missed appointments, late-filed 
report forms, or curfew violations may be disregarded entirely or handled 
with an informal reminder or admonition.  Agent responses to low-level 
violations vary tremendously, even within the same office.  Compare these 
three responses to the problem of late-filed report forms: 
Agent 1: I’m not a huge stickler on the monthly report forms.  Get it to me. . . .  I 
understand people have time limitations and paperwork is just not some people’s 
thing, and I get that.  To me, that’s not as important as being in contact with me and 
letting me know what’s going on with them in their life.  I prefer that over looking at 
[a] piece of paper.118 
Agent 2: [I]f you know of a violation, you should always bring it up, and you should 
always point out what they should be doing and what they didn’t do correctly.  This is 
what you want. . . . [T]he very technical, very minor things—I’ve tried to stress with 
[people under supervision]—this may impact . . . get[ting] you discharged early.119 
Agent 3: I know some people who, as soon as that report is late, they’re whipping out 
a letter saying, get it in!  And I might be more negligent and say, you know, the next 
time I see that person, “you know, you’re two reports behind,” and, you know, let 
them get it caught up.120 
Other violations, such as contact with a former codefendant or 
unauthorized travel, may be given informal treatment as well.  These “street 
level” discretionary decisions are often made by community corrections 
officers without the guidance of formal law or policy and are not 
infrequently left undocumented.121 
When a violation is significant enough to warrant a formal response 
from the supervising agent, either due to its severity or frequency, or to the 
proclivities of the individual agent, the options for responding will vary 
according to the policies and procedures of the local jurisdiction.  
Sometimes the law requires revocation for a small category of particularly 
serious violations.122  More often, however, agents have wide authority to 
take actions ranging from recounseling the offender on his obligations to 
initiating revocation proceedings. 
 
117 See Ohlin et al., supra note 109, at 215. 
118 Interview with Correctional Agent (July 25, 2012). 
119 Interview with Correctional Agent (Jan. 13, 2013). 
120 Interview with Correctional Agent (July 25, 2012). 
121 Field observations; interviews with Correctional Agents (June 2012 to Jan. 2013). 
122 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(b), 3583(g) (2012). 
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The number of intermediate options available to the agent will vary 
considerably from one jurisdiction to the next. Often, they include 
modifying the conditions of supervision (usually with consent of the 
offender); referring the offender for outpatient or inpatient counseling or 
treatment; placing the offender under closer surveillance through increased 
visits or electronic monitoring; or even detaining the offender for a brief 
time in the local jail.  Which of these options the agent selects will vary 
based on a combination of officer proclivity, office culture, and 
administrative guidelines, if any exist.123 
When an agent determines that revocation is the proper response to a 
rule violation, he must ordinarily petition either a court or administrative 
agency to hold a hearing on the alleged violation and impose a sanction 
when evidence of a violation is found.124  Following the historical pattern 
that links probation to courts and post-release supervision to correctional 
agencies, in many jurisdictions, judges determine the sanctions for 
probation violations and boards of parole or other Executive Branch 
agencies set sanctions for violations of post-release supervision.125  In some 
places, the supervising agency itself holds hearings to decide whether a 
person in its charge has violated the conditions of release and whether 
revocation is appropriate.126 
At a revocation hearing, individuals under supervision are entitled to 
minimal due process protections.127  They are entitled to notice of the 
 
123 Cf. Todd R. Clear & Edward J. Latessa, Probation Officers’ Roles in Intensive 
Supervision: Surveillance Versus Treatment, 10 JUST. Q. 441, 441 (1993) (finding little 
evidence that officers integrate the conflicting roles required of them, and noting in its 
abstract instead that “[t]he ‘law enforcer’ role appears to be a product of both personal 
philosophy and organizational policy, whereas the ‘social worker’ role is influenced more 
heavily by organizational policy”); McCleary, supra note 110, at 224 (examining the 
structural dynamics of revocation decisions and concluding that the research data suggest 
that “the agent of failure [in revocation cases] may often lie in the structural dynamic of the 
parole supervision agency”). 
124 The evidentiary standards for revocation hearings are low.  The rules of evidence do 
not ordinarily apply at such hearings, and the state’s burden of proof is usually set at a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
125 See, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 14, § 80-4.030(1) (2012) (“When the board chooses to 
pursue revocation of probation, parole, or conditional release, the alleged violator has the right to a 
revocation hearing before the authority that originally granted the probation, parole, or conditional 
release.”); see also IOWA CODE § 908.4(1) (2002) (“The parole revocation hearing shall be 
conducted by an administrative parole judge who is an attorney.”). 
126 See, e.g., 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 146.9(a) (2013) (“The parole panel or designee of 
the board shall conduct the [parole] revocation hearing.”).  
127 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
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alleged violation and may call witnesses and testify in their own 
defenses.128  They are also entitled to the assistance of counsel in 
connection with the revocations.129  Proving a violation ordinarily requires 
no more than a preponderance of the evidence,130 and evidentiary standards 
are relaxed.  Hearsay is usually admissible,131 and the exclusionary rule 
does not bar consideration of evidence that may have been obtained in 
violation of a supervisee’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.132  
Except where revocation is mandatory,133 a decisionmaker ordinarily has a 
number of sanctions available if she finds that a violation has occurred.  
Typically, available sanctions include modifying the conditions of release 
or returning the offender to custody for all or some of the remainder of his 
sentence.  In the case of probation revocation, if a sentence was withheld 
(rather than suspended), the sentencing court can choose from all 
dispositional options that were available at the time of the original 
sentencing. 
Given the frequency with which rules of release are violated and the 
ease with which such violations can be proven, it should come as no 
surprise that revocation is a fairly commonplace event.  The size of the 
population under community supervision is so significant that “revoking 
even a few percent of them or revoking all those who are rearrested can 
 
471, 483 (1972); see also Joel Bassett, Note, Discretionary Power and Procedural Rights in 
the Granting and Revoking of Probation, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 479, 
489–90 (1969). 
128 See Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 786; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487–88. 
129 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967); Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781. 
130 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.220(h) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) 
(2001); see also Hadar Aviram with Valerie Kraml & Nicole Schmidt, Dangerousness, Risk, 
and Release, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 175, 184 (2010) (observing that in 
California the “standard of proof for [revocation] hearings is a mere preponderance of the 
evidence, which is problematic considering that the hearings are not limited to technical 
returns, but can be used to adjudicate new crimes as well”). 
131 But see GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(b) (West 2013) (making rules of evidence 
applicable to probation revocation hearings). 
132 Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1998) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not bar introduction of evidence seized in violation of a parolee’s 
Fourth Amendment rights at a revocation hearing); see also Duncan N. Stevens, Note, Off 
the Mapp: Parole Revocation Hearings and the Fourth Amendment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1047, 1047 (1999). 
133 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(b), 3583(g) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-625(3) 
(2004) (“The court shall revoke probation if the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply 
with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the order or has been convicted of a 
felony.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-9(b-5) (2007) (imposing mandatory revocation 
for sex offenders found living with other known sex offenders). 
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have a dramatic impact on prison admissions.”134  That is exactly what has 
happened. 
IV. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF REVOCATION 
A. WHAT PROBLEM? 
High revocation rates alone tell us little about the proper function of 
community supervision.  In fact, high rates of revocation invite any number 
of potentially contradictory conclusions: that the sanction is overused 
because inappropriate candidates are being selected for community-based 
punishment; that the sanction is overly punitive because the kind and 
number of conditions make compliance impossible; that community 
supervision is functioning well because correctional agents are being 
vigilant in returning to custody those who pose threats to public safety; or 
that community supervision is fundamentally broken because too many 
people are failing to successfully complete their terms in the community.  
Before proposing legislative responses to the “problem” of revocation, it is 
useful to determine whether a problem exists, and if so, what the nature of 
that problem might be. 
Criticism of high revocation rates has come from many quarters.  First, 
and most vocal, are legislators and correctional administrators desperate to 
reduce the costs of incarceration.  Spending on corrections has been 
growning at a faster pace than any other category of state spending except 
Medicaid.135  As budgets continue to shrink, states are no longer capable of 
 
134 Petersilia, supra note 29, at 166 (reporting that between 30% and 50% of all new 
prison admissions stem from probation and parole failures).  Because counties rarely collect 
data in ways that permit easy analysis across jurisdictions, much more is known about post-
release revocation rates and procedures than is known about probation revocation.  See id. at 
179–85.  Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general estimates of the prevalence of 
revocation based on state-specific studies. 
135 CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN 
CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009.pdf (citing data compiled by 
the National Association of State Budget Officers).  In some states, corrections spending has 
now eclipsed spending on higher education.  See, e.g., Katherine Buslacchi, Pa. May Spend 
More on Prisons than Higher Education, Corbett Says, DAILY COLLEGIAN, Feb. 14, 2013, 
http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2013/02/14/jails_and_drug_counseling.aspx; see also 
Alison Bauter, As Priorities Shift, Corrections Budget Passes UW System, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., 
Aug. 16, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-corrections-spending-
passes-that-of-uw-system-ua62t4k-166039926.html (“In 2011, Wisconsin state spending quietly 
hit a milestone: For the first time, the state budgeted more taxpayer dollars for prisons and 
correctional facilities than for the University of Wisconsin System.”); Commentary, Jail Not 
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paying the bills associated with prison growth.  Consequently, many 
lawmakers have become eager to find ways to manage offenders in less 
expensive, noncustodial settings whenever possible.136  From this purely 
financial perspective, revocation is seen as a problem, because it increases 
the number of people in prison and the attendant costs of confining them. 
Whether it is legitimate for cost to play a role in sentencing decisions 
is a matter of some debate.  When the State of Missouri recently introduced 
a “cost information system” that allows sentencing judges to compare the 
cost of various sentencing options,137 it evoked strong reactions from 
supporters and detractors alike.138  Pragmatists hailed it as a long-overdue 
way of focusing judges’ attention on the real consequences of their 
sentencing practices.139  Critics decried it as an illegitimate attempt to 
substitute punishment based on desert with utilitarian considerations wholly 
unrelated to offenders’ culpability.140 
The same philosophical debates that attend cost considerations at 
 
College, PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 5, 2010, at 6 (“For the fourth year in a row, Rhode Island is 
spending more on its Department of Corrections than on higher education . . . .”). 
136 See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, To Save Money on Prisons, States Take a Softer Stance, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 18, 2009, at 1A (reporting on a new Kansas law that “gives local probation 
departments broader authority to decide whether technical violations of release, such as missed 
meetings with probation officers or failed drug tests, should result in prison”). 
137 See Monica Davey, Touching Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A1 (“For someone convicted of endangering the welfare of a 
child, for instance, a judge might now learn that a three-year prison sentence would run more 
than $37,000 while probation would cost $6,770.  A second-degree robber, a judge could be 
told, would carry a price tag of less than $9,000 for five years of intensive probation, but 
more than $50,000 for a comparable prison sentence and parole afterward.  The bill for a 
murderer’s 30-year prison term: $504,690.”). 
138 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Are Costs a Unique (and Uniquely Problematic) Kind 
of Sentencing Data?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 159, 160 (2012) (arguing that “it is hard to be 
seriously opposed to, or even skeptical about, modern movement toward these ‘evidence-
based’ sentencing policies and practices”); Ryan W. Scott, How (Not) to Implement Cost as 
Sentencing Factor, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 173–76 (2012); Michael A. Wolff, Missouri 
Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What Does Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 
24 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 162–63 (2012). 
139 See, e.g., Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety of 
Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 169, 171 (2012) 
(“I unabashedly favor endeavors, such as the one in Missouri, to better inform judges’ 
sentencing decisions and to bring more transparency into the sentencing process.”). 
140 See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri’s Experiment, 77 
MO. L. REV. 391, 410 (2012) (“Cost as a sentencing factor should be presumptively 
disfavored.  Although we probably cannot excise all consideration of cost in sentencing, we 
should not make it a salient factor for judges to consider.”); Davey, supra note 137, at A1 
(“Justice isn’t subject to a mathematical formula . . . .” (quoting St. Louis County Prosecutor 
Robert P. McCulloch) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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sentencing attend cost considerations related to revocation of community 
supervision.  For good or ill, considerations of cost are embedded in the 
functioning of the criminal justice system and consequently must be 
confronted.141  While this is true as a matter of pragmatism, there are 
dangers in crafting criminal justice policy with the primary goal of saving 
money.142  In a system of law that purports to exercise moral authority, it is 
essential that law and policymakers grapple with what is fair and not merely 
what is cost effective.143 
While cost has been a driving factor in the willingness of legislatures 
to “do something” to reduce revocation rates, criticism has come from other 
quarters, too.  Advocates of “evidence-based practices” have argued that 
most jurisdictions engage in misdirected supervision practices that place too 
many conditions on low-risk offenders (leading to unnecessary revocation 
for minor infractions unrelated to public safety) and too few constraints on 
high-risk offenders (allowing dangerous violators to go undetected and 
unpunished).  They point to a small but growing body of quantitative 
research that has identified measurable offender characteristics that 
correspond to individuals’ statistical risk of criminal reoffense and suggest 
that relying on actuarial risk prediction tools can help judges decide whom 
to place on supervision, what services to offer, and what level of 
surveillance to provide.  While proponents of “evidence-based” practices do 
not condemn high revocation rates per se, most agree that a significant 
number of revocations are unnecessary and could be avoided through more 
strategic supervision practices.  From this perspective, high revocation rates 
are problematic because they point to inefficiencies in the allocation of 
 
141 Scott, supra note 138, at 173 (“[N]o real-world criminal justice system can 
completely ignore costs, at least at a systemic level.”). 
142 For an example of the inhumane form such cost-saving measures might take, see 
Editorial, Two Meals and Not Always Square, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at A20 (decrying 
efforts to save money in prisons by cutting the number and quality of meals served to inmates). 
143 In a provocative essay, Michael Tonry has criticized the willingness of progressive 
reformers to frame law changes that reduce prison populations as cost-saving measures, 
rather than morally necessary ones.  Michael Tonry, Making Peace, Not a Desert: Penal 
Reform Should be About Values Not Justice Reinvestment, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
637, 638 (2011).  He points out that the arguments that led to harsh sentencing laws and 
penal practices were largely moral ones: victims deserved justice; offenders deserved 
punishment.  “No one should be surprised,” he asserts, “that normative arguments based on 
ideas about justice and moral rights and wrongs often trump instrumental ones.”  Id.  The 
lesson to be learned is that although changes in the laws governing community supervision 
may have the benefit of saving money, that benefit should be viewed as incidental to the 
primary goal of fairly administering the criminal justice system.  If new laws are not morally 
defensible, then they ought not to be enacted. 
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limited correctional resources. 
Other concerns are more fundamental and challenge the assumption 
that community supervision and its attendant conditions have any effect on 
the criminal behavior of those under supervision.  The conditions that attach 
to a sentence of community supervision often restrict behavior that is 
otherwise lawful in an attempt to promote rehabilitation and control threats 
to public safety.  The enforcement of those conditions is morally justified 
only if it is plausible to believe that they may actually be capable of 
accomplishing their desired purposes.  There are many reasons to think, 
however, that conditions of supervision are often neutral, and sometimes 
even detrimental, to the ability of convicted individuals to lead law-abiding 
lives. 
Critics have long observed that the rate of criminal reoffending by 
those under supervision seems fairly unaffected by the availability of 
treatment programs, or even the nature of interactions between agents and 
their clients.144  Many of the factors that most influence desistance from 
crime, including age and personal narrative, bear little connection to the 
conditions and programatic interventions imposed by sentences of 
community supervision.145  Some have attributed this to static 
 
144 See, e.g., England, supra note 39, at 668 (“The supporters of probation are 
characteristically disposed to credit the relatively low post-probation failure rates found in 
most studies to the rehabilitative value of this correctional device; the problem of controlling 
variables is such, however, that no conclusive evidence has appeared demonstrating that the 
probation experience is the independent variable in these low rates.”).  More recent studies 
have reached similar conclusions.  A 2005 study comparing rearrest rates for individuals 
released through both mandatory and discretionary supervision schemes and those released 
without supervision found no differences at all between those without supervision and those 
released with supervision under mandatory release schemes.  (As expected, those selected 
for release by discretionary decisionmakers performed somewhat better than their peers.)  
AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., DOES PAROLE WORK?: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF 
POSTPRISON SUPERVISION ON REARREST OUTCOMES 8 (2005); James Bonta et al., Exploring 
the Black Box of Community Supervision, 47 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 248, 251 (2008) 
(reporting study findings that indicated no statistically significant relationship between 
community supervision and the incidence of violent recidivism).  A recent study of 
predictors of reoffense by Kentucky parolees reached the following conclusion:  
All five statistically significant predictions of reincarceration for a parole violation are ‘static’ 
variables that describe attributes of demographics (race) and experience (gang membership, 
number of prior incarcerations, number of institutions served in, and final custody classification).  
Although (perhaps) indicators of risk, these are not variables that can be affected by a method of 
supervision. 
Gennaro F. Vito et al., Characteristics of Parole Violators in Kentucky, 76 FED. PROBATION 
19, 21 (2012). 
145 See, e.g., SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD 
THEIR LIVES 85–108 (2001) (discussing how personal narratives of success correspond to 
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characteristics of those under supervision, in particular those on probation: 
Augustus and his immediate successors are reputed to have had high rates of success 
in reforming their charges, despite the fact that Augustus (and this is probably true of 
his Boston disciples) was not even remotely a specialist in behavior problems, and 
apparently had no training in even the crude behavior sciences of his day.  What he 
did have in common with his followers of today, however, was the fact that his 
probationers were first offenders and minor recidivists released to him for supervision 
under suspended sentences, and it is just here that an explanation may lie for the 
observed uniformity in probation success-failure rates. . . .  Criminologists might do 
well to consider the possibility that in the circumstances common to most probation 
systems—in the ordinary selectivity of clients and the ordinary routines of 
operation—may lie the real clues to the apparent effectiveness of this correctional 
device.146 
Some have argued that supervision not only does little good but may 
cause overt harm.  Christine S. Scott-Hayward has documented the effects 
of supervision on offenders’ abilities to secure and maintain employment 
and reestablish familial connections and has found that, in some cases, 
supervision methods and conditions interfere with successful reentry.147 
Like any discretionary decision made within the criminal justice 
system, revocation is subject to criticisms that it is arbitrary and “lawless” 
insofar as the decision of how or whether to respond to rule violations is left 
in the hands of unguided agents.148  Worse still is the allegation that the 
decision to revoke may be not only arbitrary but covertly discriminatory.  
Studies of state revocation practices have found that individuals of color are 
in some instances more likely to be revoked from community supervision 
than are their white counterparts for identical violations.149 
 
desistance from crime).  See generally JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED 
BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70 (2003) (describing the strong 
effects of aging on rates criminal offending).  There is also, however, a strong body of 
literature finding that reductions in the consumption of illegal drugs also reduces criminal 
offending.  Because substance-abuse treatment and avoidance of illegal drugs are often 
conditions of supervision, probation and post-release supervision may well reduce criminal 
reoffense among individuals who struggle with addiction. 
146 England, supra note 39, at 675–76.  Half a century later, England’s observations 
remain timely. 
147 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 448. 
148 See Benjamin Steiner et al., Short-Term Effects of Sanctioning Reform on Parole 
Officers’ Revocation Decisions, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371, 373–77 (2011) (connecting the 
problem with agent discretion to literature on the discretionary power of judges and other 
criminal justice system actors). 
149 See, e.g., SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 16 (2008), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.pdf. 
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These various criticisms, grounded in both pragmatism and principle, 
suggest that high revocation rates are a problem for a host of reasons.  The 
next question is how that problem can be remedied. 
B. NEW LEGAL RESPONSES 
The concerns of “evidence-based” researchers and cost-conscious 
politicians have proven synergistic.  In the past ten years, a number of states 
have passed laws and changed policies, hoping to save money by reducing 
their rates of revocation.  Much of this new legislation requires agents to 
make use of the actuarial risk assessment tools advocated by evidence-
based practitioners when deciding both the level of supervision that will be 
imposed upon particular offenders and how severely to sanction violations 
of release conditions.  These developments are being implemented in a 
variety of ways, but the most common are laws that limit revocation for 
technical violations and policies that require the use of formal sanctioning 
grids. 
1. Limits on Sanctioning Technical Violations 
Policymakers recognize that not all conditions of release are of equal 
importance.  One way in which they have tried to contain revocation rates is 
by barring revocation as a sanction for many noncriminal violations.  These 
so-called technical violations—so denominated because failure to comply 
with them is only prohibited by the technicality of the community 
supervision order—have long been associated with overly punitive 
revocation.  Consequently, many new laws prohibit revocation for many 
common, low-level violations. 
North Carolina provides a good example of this phenomenon.  In 
2011, the state passed its Justice Reinvestment Act in response to high 
revocation rates.150  The Act made a number of changes to state laws 
governing revocation in an effort to reduce reliance on revocation as a 
sanction for rule violations.  The state’s approach was twofold.  First, it 
delegated to probation agents the power to impose short jail stay sanctions 
without the need for judicial review,151 allowing agents to respond 
 
150 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws; see also MICHELLE HALL ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA 
SENTENCING AND & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT ACT 
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION REPORT 2–4 (2013), available at http://www.nccourts.org/
Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/JRIReports-2013.pdf. 
151 These short stays, which do not exceed “six days of jail confinement during any three 
separate months of a period of probation, for a total confinement time of up to 18 days,” are 
referred to as “quick dips.”  Jamie Markham, Quick Dips, N.C. CRIM. L.: UNC SCH. GOV’T 
BLOG (Nov. 3, 2011), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=3023.  Longer “dunks” of ninety 
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immediately to detected technical violations.  Second, the new laws 
prohibited revocation for any reason other than absconding from 
supervision or committing a new crime (with an exception for individuals 
who had twice previously been sanctioned to ninety days of confinement as 
an alternative to revocation152). 
In 2010, Alabama also restricted the ability of courts to revoke 
probation and parole as a result of technical violations.153  Supporters of the 
law asserted that the changes would produce an $18 million savings in the 
annual cost of revocation and provide sensible alternatives to 
imprisonment.154  Under the new law, as originally drafted, full revocation 
was available only when a person under supervision commited a new crime; 
in all other instances, sanctions were capped at ninety days’ confinement.155  
Notably, in 2011, the law was amended to eliminate the distinction between 
new crimes for which revocation was available and “technical violations” 
for which it was not.  Under the revised law, revocation is now a 
permissible sanction not only for new law violations but also for 
“[p]ossession, receipt, or transportation of any firearm”; “[a]ny violation of 
any condition prohibiting contact with any victim”; and “[a] violation of 
any condition which presented a danger to the health, safety, or welfare of 
any person.”156 
Many additional states, including Louisiana,157 Washington,158 and 
 
days may be imposed by courts for violations short of absconding and new criminal conduct.  
See Jamie Markham, Confinement in Response to Violations (CRV) and Limits on Probation 
Revocation Authority, N.C. CRIM. L.: UNC SCH. GOV’T BLOG (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
Markham, Confinement], http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=2994. 
152 See Markham, Confinement, supra note 151. 
153 NICOLE D. PORTER, SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2011: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 11 (2012). 
154 See Alabama Reforms Probation Law to Promote Safety and Reduce Prison 
Crowding, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (May 10, 2010), http://www.eji.org/node/391. 
155 ALA. CODE § 15-22-54 (2010). 
156 Id. § 15-22-54(e)(1). 
157 PORTER, supra note 153, at 11–12 (“Prior to reform, an individual whose parole or 
probation was revoked for a first technical violation was required to serve up to 90 days in custody 
or a maximum sentence of six months in a drug diversion program.  HB 415 authorizes a parole or 
probation officer to impose administrative sanctions for a technical violation of parole or 
probation conditions, if the Board of Parole or court determines that the offender is eligible and 
when certain requirements are met including the offender waiving the right to a violation hearing.  
According to the Department of Corrections, in 2010 there were 4,258 individuals who violated 
the conditions of their probation or parole.  The new measure is expected to save the state more 
than $3.9 million by reducing the length of confinement for certain prisoners.”). 
158 Washington State takes a fairly extreme position with respect to revocation.  
 
2013] RETHINKING THE USE OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 1049 
Oregon,159 also have enacted laws that restrict the ability of decisionmakers 
to revoke community supervision for individuals who commit certain kinds 
of rule violations.  While such legislation undoubtedly reduces the number 
of individuals who are formally revoked from community supervision and 
placed in prison, it is important to notice that these “reforms” do not 
eliminate the use of custodial sanctions.  Sentences of one week, thirty 
days, or even ninety days are not insignificant.  They impose both financial 
costs (in terms of jail beds used) and human costs (in terms of lost 
employment, housing, and child custody).  In evaluating the “success” of 
new legislation, these significant burdens should not be discounted. 
Moreover, as the Alabama experience illustrates, placing categorical 
limits on revocation for certain types of behavior can have unintended 
consequences.  The distinction between “technical violations” and “new 
crimes” glosses over many important differences in the severity of the 
conduct that underlies a violation.  In some cases, a new crime does not 
justify revocation.  Disorderly conduct and many other low-level 
misdemeanors rarely signify a true threat to the community and often merit 
only minor sanctions best handled by sentencing in the new criminal case.  
Conversely, technical violations may involve dangerous behavior that 
merits revocation.  The pedophile who stalks the playground may be 
engaged in grooming behaviors that pose a genuine threat to community 
safety and undermine his own rehabilitation.  In such cases, limiting the 
ability of correctional agencies and courts to revoke supervision may 
undermine, rather than improve, the legitimacy of conditional release. 
2. Graduated Sanction Grids 
Even when community supervision officers have alternative sanctions 
at their disposal, institutional culture, misinformed assumptions about risk, 
and personal preferences may lead agents to seek custodial penalties (and 
 
Ordinarily, “[a]n offender who violates any condition or requirement of a sentence may be 
sanctioned by the court with up to sixty days’ confinement for each violation or by the 
department with up to thirty days’ confinement . . . .”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.94A.633(1)(a) (West 2012).  A person charged with a new felony offense may have 
community supervisions “suspended” only when he is subject to a term of supervision in 
another state or has been released on discretionary parole.  Id. § 9.94A.633(4). 
159 Oregon law defines several kinds of rule violations for which revocation is restricted 
or unavailable.  For example, probation cannot be revoked “as a result of the probationer’s 
failure to pay restitution unless the court determines from the totality of the circumstances 
that the purposes of the probation are not being served.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(9) 
(2011).  It is also “not a cause for revocation of probation that the probationer failed to apply 
for or accept employment at any workplace where there is a labor dispute in progress.”  Id. 
§ 137.540(10). 
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may lead decisionmakers to impose them) more often than policymakers 
desire.  Categorical restrictions on revocation are one response to this 
problem.  Another is the use of sanctioning guidelines. 
In response to criticism that revocation is too often a disproportionate 
response to rule violations, many departments have developed 
administrative sanctioning grids for use by all community correctional 
agents.160  Some simply match the severity of an infraction to the severity of 
the authorized response.  Other grids, such as the one used in 
Massachussets, are structured more like the guidelines often used by 
sentencing courts.161  These tend to be grids arranged along two axes: one 
for the severity of the infraction and one that tracks either the “risk level” of 
the person under supervision (again, low, medium, or high) or the number 
of previous violations.  In some states, each square of the grid contains a 
narrow range of periods of confinement, which may be imposed upon 
revocation or as an alternative to it.162  Others (for example Minnesota) are 
less directive, and provide a menu of options from which correctional 
agents may select when responding to rule violations.163  Noncustodial 
sanctions are preferred to custodial ones, but options up to full revocation 
remain available for serious violations and repeat offenders.  Administrative 
guidelines can reduce revocation rates by encouraging (or requiring) agents 
to make use of alternatives to revocation before using prison as a sanction.  
More importantly, they can help encourage sanctioning practices that are 
prudent and parsimonious.  Insofar as they require agents to respond to all 
violations, such guidelines improve the certainty of punishment, increasing 
specific deterrence,164 and insofar as they encourage agents to try a variety 
 
160 See, e.g., 37 PA. CODE § 75.1 (1979) (establishing presumptive guidelines for parole 
revocation). 
161 See infra Appendix 1. 
162 Unlike sentencing guidelines, which are usually made public, revocation guidelines are 
often closely guarded by supervising agencies, presumably out of concern that offenders would 
not be deterred from violating rules if they knew that the sanction imposed would be 
insubstantial.  That approach is in deep tension with behavioral modification theories that 
emphasize the importance of certainty in punishment.  See generally ANGELA HAWKEN & 
MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN 
SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE (2009) (reporting favorably on the effects of clear 
and certain punishment in deterring rule violations by individuals on conditional release); Faye 
S. Taxman et al., Graduated Sanctions: Stepping into Accountable Systems and Offenders, 79 
PRISON J. 182, 187 (1999) (asserting that certainty of punishment deters reoffense). 
163 See infra Appendix 2. 
164 Beau Kilmer et al., Efficacy of Frequent Monitoring with Swift, Certain, and Modest 
Sanctions for Violations: Insights from South Dakota’s 24/7 Sobriety Project, 103 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH e37, e41–e42 (2013); see also HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 162, at 17–18. 
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of less punitive sanctions before resorting to custodial sentences, they 
increase proportional responses to rule violations.  These are welcome 
improvements. 
Often, guidelines do not merely suggest alternatives to revocation but 
set forth a hierarchy of increasingly severe sanctions that agents are 
required to apply systematically to each subsequent violation.165  This 
“graduated sanctions” approach purports to be grounded in principles of 
procedural justice.  From this perspective, the legitimacy of the sanction 
turns on how predictably it is enforced: 
Applying procedural justice theory to the supervision setting argues for a proactive 
process that aligns sanctions with expected response patterns.  Sanctions are the crime 
prevention tool because they provide swift and certain responses to negative behavior. 
. . .  [P]robation agents who respond shortly after the noncompliant act is known and 
who respond in a decisive and consistent manner are more likely to use proactive 
processes that increase the perception of the fairness and appropriateness of the 
action.  The tendency of the criminal justice system to favor individualized responses 
or the tailoring of responses to circumstances may actually enhance the perception of 
unfairness (i.e., some offenders are treated differently for the same behavior, such as 
positive urine, etc.).  A perception of unfairness may increase noncompliance due to 
offenders’ resentment.166 
Graduated sanctions purport to respond also to concerns about procedural 
justice by “integrat[ing] sanctions into the expected response patterns.”  By 
adopting formulaic responses to rule violations, graduated sanctions 
consciously disavow individualized justice in favor of predictability.167 
There are several potential problems with guidelines that require 
agents to respond to violations with incremental harshness.  First, the 
deterrence they seek to promote only works if punishment is “certain” and 
“predictable.”  That can only happen when rule violations are detected with 
regularity.  In other words, the success of the model requires agents to 
detect a large percentage of violations.  Such detection is only possible with 
increased surveillance, with all of its negative repercussions.168 
More importantly, graduated sanction grids do not address the more 
important problem of unnecessary rules of supervision.  Responding 
“swiftly” and “certainly” to all violations is only fair when the rules that 
have been violated are worthy of sanction.  Graduated sanctions make no 
distinction between rules that matter and rules that do not; consequently, 
they can impose increasingly severe punishments for infractions that 
 
165 Taxman et al., supra note 162, at 190–91. 
166 Id. at 187. 
167 Id. 
168 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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endanger the public as well as those that do not. 
3. Effects of Legal Change 
Most laws designed to reduce revocation rates are relatively new and 
have not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing or the test of time. 
Simple studies conducted by stakeholders in a few states have reported 
modest success in terms of cost reduction—at least in the short run.  In 
California, new laws resulted in a 23% reduction in probation revocation in 
their first year at a much-touted savings of $179 million.169  A recent study 
by Texas’s Legislative Budget Board found that the rearrest rate for 
individuals on community supervision fell from “47.1 percent . . . to 36.8 
percent” over a four-year period,170 a change researchers indicated can be 
affected by factors such as changes in supervision practices and in release 
and revocation policies of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.171  In 
Kansas, revocation rates reportedly declined by almost 25% as a result of 
the implementation of “evidence-based practices” designed to reduce 
imprisonment.172  Despite the limited data available on the degree to which 
legal changes have reduced revocation rates, many advocates are cautiously 
optimistic that these new laws and practices are succeeding in reducing the 
number of people on community supervision who are returned to prison as 
a result of rule violations. 
If immediate cost savings were the only measure by which successful 
reform were measured, then it would be easy to applaud the union of 
frugality and behavioral science that appears to be producing promising 
results.  The problem is that such a response glosses over important and 
difficult questions about the way in which these new laws operate and their 
long-term effects on the legitimacy of conditional release sanctions. 
Community supervision has historically been attentive to the needs of 
offenders and to the context in which they act.  Guidelines, on the other 
hand, are more concerned with predictable and evenhanded outcomes than 
 
169 PEW CTR. ON STATES, CALIFORNIA’S PROBATION, supra note 80, at 3 (citing ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 1 REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT (2011), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-1-Report-FINAL.pdf). 
170 LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BD., STATEWIDE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECIDIVISM AND 




172 Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 456. 
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with culpability or need.  The restrictions that legislatures are now placing 
on the discretionary power of agents and courts to respond to rule violations 
can find themselves at odds with the rehabilitative goals of probation and 
post-release supervision, as such restrictions function in ways that can be 
either overly punitive or excessively lenient, depending on the nature and 
circumstances of any given rule violation. 
As an example, consider a rule that requires a probation agent to 
impose graduated sanctions for all violations of supervision.  Imagine that a 
person under supervision fails to file her monthly report form for three 
consecutive months.  The first month, her agent reminds her of her 
obligation.  The second month, the agent reminds her again and requires her 
to report to the office for her next visit with a completed form.  When she 
fails to do so and another month passes with no form, following the 
graduated sanction scale, the agent imposes five days’ jail time. 
If the probationer failed to file her form because reporting the details 
of her financial life caused her intense anxiety—forcing her to confront her 
dire financial straits and inability to adequately support her family—then a 
sanction of imprisonment might be unduly harsh and, to the degree it 
interferes with her employment, counterproductive.  In such an instance, 
giving the agent discretion to work with the probationer to complete her 
forms or to access treatment for anxiety before “graduating” to custodial 
sanctions would be more in keeping with the rehabilitative goals of 
probation, particularly if the crime of conviction had nothing to do with her 
finances.  On the other hand, if the probationer failed to file her report form 
because she was trying to hide from the agent evidence of new debt she had 
incurred or money she had obtained by manipulating others, then a sentence 
of five days’ jail might be insufficient to hold her accountable, particularly 
if her crime of conviction involved defrauding others.173 
As this example illustrates, revocation guidelines often find themselves 
in tension with considerations of individualized justice that legitimize the 
practice of community supervision.174  In their best form, guidelines 
promote fair and proportionate responses to rule violations by encouraging 
alternatives to revocation.  If they are too rigid, however, they risk 
sanctioning behavior that does not deserve censure or underpunishing more 
 
173 The examples in this paragraph are derived from two real cases that the author was 
able to observe and discuss with agents in the field.  In these cases, offenders on post-release 
supervision failed to file monthly financial forms for two very different reasons. 
174 See generally Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933 (1995) 
(discussing the tension between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ retributive philosophy 
and probation officers’ fundamentally rehabilitative orientation). 
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culpable conduct.  While guidelines are a useful tool in guiding the 
discretionary responses of correctional officers and revocation 
decisionmakers, they are inadequate to fully address the challenge of 
responding to rule violations. 
V. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: LIMITING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION 
Mass incarceration is a real problem, and it deserves a legal response.  
Given the emphasis that reformers have placed on expanding opportunities 
for offenders to serve community-based sentences,175 it seems 
counterintuitive to suggest that a better solution to the problem of over-
incarceration may be to limit the use of community supervision as a 
sanction for crime.  Nonetheless, it is a proposal worth taking seriously. 
Limitations on community supervision sentences can come in many 
forms.  Limiting the use of community supervision does not necessarily 
mean imposing fewer total sentences of probation or post-release 
supervision.  It also does not mean replacing sentences of community 
supervision with terms of imprisonment—at least, not in most cases.  What 
it does mean is asking decisionmakers to structure and utilize community 
supervision sanctions in new ways.  Legislators must exercise restraint 
when setting the length and number of conditions that attach to community 
sentences.  Judges and lawyers must be more strategic in selecting the 
individuals for whom community supervision sanctions are appropriate.  
Correctional officials must be judicious in imposing discretionary release 
conditions and in deciding how to respond to violations, paying attention to 
the purposes those sanctions are intended to serve.176 
A great deal of injustice can be avoided and a great many resources 
conserved if more careful attention is given to three key decisions: whom to 
place on supervision; what conditions to attach to the supervisory term; and 
how long supervision should last.  By exercising parsimony in each of these 
decisions, courts and correctional agencies can ensure that community 
supervision terms serve the purposes for which they were designed and do 
not end in unjustified incarceration.177 
 
175 See, e.g., SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 149, at 16. 
176 See generally Michael E. Smith, Will the Real Alternatives Please Stand Up?, 12 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171 (1983–1984) (discussing alternatives to incarceration 
and the need to develop enforceable punishments and strategies for social control—other 
than incarceration). 
177 Cf. Michael E. Smith, Let Specificity, Clarity, and Parsimony of Purpose Be Our 
Guide, 20 L. & POL’Y 491, 500–05 (1998). 
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A. LIMITING THE SANCTION 
By definition, a person who is not serving a term of conditional release 
cannot be revoked.  While community supervision sentences serve many 
important purposes, they necessarily hold out the possibility of 
imprisonment.  Consequently, it is shortsighted to view community 
supervision terms as true “alternatives” to incarceration.  They are “possible 
alternatives” at best.  Therefore, when a court is persuaded that the proper 
punishment for an offender is a truly noncustodial sanction, it should select 
a sentence that does not impose the contingent liability of community 
supervision.  Too often, such alternatives are overlooked on both the front 
and back ends of the sentence. 
At sentencing, except in the most minor of misdemeanor cases, most 
actors in the criminal justice system (including prosecutors, defense 
counsels, and judges) tend to view probation as the only alternative to jail 
or prison.  The choice of what sentence to impose is seen as binary, and 
consequently, probation is used in a host of cases in which it is not an 
appropriate sanction.  Examples abound.  Probation may be used to make it 
appear that the court is “doing something” in a case where the victim is 
vocally unhappy, but the offender’s criminal conduct was minor, his 
contrition is sincere, and his risk of reoffense is nil.  It may be offered to 
induce a plea of guilty from a defendant whose offense is serious, but 
whose past record or personal deficits clearly render him incapable of 
complying with even the most basic conditions of release.  (In such cases, 
the inevitablility of revocation will be obvious to everyone in the courtroom 
except, perhaps, the defendant himself.)  Probation may be imposed merely 
to oversee the payment of restitution to a victim of crime.  In each of these 
cases, probation is either destined to fail, does not advance public safety, or 
performs a function that could be easily accomplished outside the criminal 
justice system.  Imposing probation in these cases does not allocate limited 
supervisory resources wisely, either because it subjects individuals to 
supervision they do not need, or because it places people on conditional 
release who are certain to end up behind bars anyway.  The good news is 
that alternatives are available in these unsatisfactory cases. 
Probation has never been an appropriate sanction for every convicted 
person.  Early students of probation observed that it is best designed for 
those “convicted persons who do not need imprisonment, but who should 
not be discharged.”178  This observation suggests that there is a class of 
 
178 Mass. Prob. Sys., supra note 31, at 236–37 (emphasis added).  Those dual roles 
continue to be served by probation officers today, who persist in conducting presentence 
investigations and providing direct oversight to those placed on community supervision. 
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individuals for whom unconditional discharge—that is, conviction without 
further sanction—is sufficient punishment.  While the concept of 
unconditional discharge as a freestanding punishment may seem foreign to 
modern ears, it is a sanction that still exists in the laws of several New 
England states,179 and it has been reintroduced in early drafts of the 
proposed revision of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions.180   
The process of being charged and convicted is inherently punitive181 
and carries with it a lasting stigma.  Conviction often brings with it serious 
consequences, both formal and informal.  In addition to the social stigma 
that attaches to being a “convict,” the formal legal consequences of 
conviction often include disenfranchisement, limits on occupational 
licensing, public benefits eligibility, and a host of other noncriminal, but 
nonetheless punitive, sanctions that may endure for a lifetime.182  For many 
minor and first-time offenders, no sanction other than conviction itself may 
be needed to punish and deter: the shame and stigma of conviction will be 
adequate.  That is truer today than ever, since the collateral consequences 
that attach upon conviction now number in the hundreds for any given 
felony.183 
 
179 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-34(a) (West 1971) (“The court may impose a 
sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence 
of conditional discharge . . . if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be 
served by imposing any condition upon the defendant’s release.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17, § 1346 (2011) (A convicted person not guilty of murder “and for whom a court 
determines that no other authorized sentencing alternative is appropriate punishment must be 
sentenced by the court to an unconditional discharge.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(I) 
(LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05(1) (McKinney 1992) (“(a) . . . [T]he court may 
impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an offense if the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and to the history, character and condition of the 
defendant, is of the opinion that neither the public interest nor the ends of justice would be 
served by a sentence of imprisonment and that probation supervision is not appropriate.  (b) 
When a sentence of conditional discharge is imposed for a felony, the court shall set forth in 
the record the reasons for its action.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9723 (1980) (“If in the light of 
all the circumstances, probation would be appropriate under section 9722 (relating to order 
of probation), but it appears that probation is unnecessary, the court may impose a sentence 
of guilty without further penalty.”). 
180 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02(1)(e) (Discussion Draft No. 5, 2013). 
181 Malcolm Feeley’s classic work on the processing of criminal cases illustrates this 
point nicely.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199 (1979). 
182 See generally LOVE ET AL., supra note 4 (discussing legal and political ramifications 
of the growth and proliferation of collateral consequences). 
183 Id. at 513–16 (reporting on an ongoing American Bar Association survey of state 
laws that found an average of more than 1,000 collateral consequences per felony conviction 
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Unconditional discharge may also serve to adequately stigmatize an 
offender who has been charged with one or more serious criminal offenses, 
along with minor incidental or related misconduct that pales in comparison 
to the primary offense.  Often in such cases, a period of confinement is 
imposed on the offender for the more serious conduct, while a concurrent or 
consecutive term of probation is imposed in connection with the minor 
offense solely for the purpose of imposing what is perceived to be a 
nominal sentence for the less serious conduct.  A better practice would be to 
allow conviction alone to stigmatize the related or incidential conduct for 
which no additional punishment is required.  For example, imagine a 
defendant who drives recklessly and causes an accident that injures himself 
and a passenger in his vehicle.  When confronted by the responding officer, 
he initially gives his brother’s name, but then quickly confesses his real 
identity.  If he is later convicted of reckless driving causing injury and 
obstructing a law enforcement officer, it may well be adequate to impose a 
traditional fine, period of supervision, or short term of confinement for the 
reckless driving, and to allow conviction alone to stand as punishment for 
obstructing the officer.  
In cases where unconditional discharge alone provides insufficient 
punishment, fines stand as a viable alternative to incarceration in many 
cases.  Because fines have disparate effects on individuals of different 
socio-economic classes, courts are sometimes reticent to impose them, 
fearing they will either be uncollectable (for the poor) or a mere slap on the 
wrist (for the wealthy).  Properly imposed, however, fines can be a viable 
alternative to incarceration.  While the indigent make up a disproportionate 
share of criminal defendants,184 many of those convicted are employed and 
have available to them the means to make modest financial payments as a 
penalty for their offenses, particularly if courts are willing to permit 
payment plans that are sensitive to changes in income over time.  Similarly, 
“day fines,” which calibrate the amount of a fine to the income of those 
being sentenced, can provide an immediate sanction to those convicted of 
criminal behavior and do so in a way that does not impose additional 
obligations on low-risk individuals or require ongoing state oversight.185  
 
in the first states surveyed). 
184 According to the Office of Justice Programs, “A study of the 100 most populous 
counties in the United States found that 82 percent of indigent clients were handled by public 
defenders, 15 percent by assigned counsel attorneys, and 3 percent by contract attorneys.”  
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET (2011), available at 
http://www.ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_indigentdefense.html. 
185 See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISONS AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 113–16 (1990) (comparing 
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Day fines are routinely used in Europe as a popular and freestanding 
sanction for criminal offenses.186  While day fines have not enjoyed the 
same popularity here in the United States, they could serve as another 
sentencing option that would allow courts to hold offenders accountable for 
criminal conduct without squandering limited community correctional 
resources in cases where additional supervision is deemed unnecessary.     
Finally, there are cases in which a short jail or even prison sentence 
may be fairer (and more frugal) than a certain-to-fail sentence of 
community supervision.  Placing an untreated alcoholic on probation with a 
“no drink” condition is a recipe for disaster, as everyone in the courtroom 
(except perhaps the defendant) is well aware at the time of sentencing.  
Similar misuses of probationary sanctions are pervasive.  Prosecutors and 
defense attorneys often plea bargain for a noncustodial sentence in cases 
where it is predictably certain to fail.  Thinking that any noncustodial 
disposition is a good one, defense lawyers routinely fail to object to 
conditions of supervision that their clients cannot be expected to follow—
from avoiding contact with a best friend or lover to staying in school full-
time.  As a consequence, the “good deal” secured by the lawyer often turns 
into a delayed sentence of imprisonment for the unsuspecting defendant, 
with an ultimate punishment that is often more punitive than the custodial 
sentence a court would be likely to impose in the first instance.187  In cases 
such as these, probation cannot plausibly serve its intended purposes of 
furthering rehabilitation and public safety.  In these cases, probation is a 
“set up” for later revocation that will likely be followed by a term of 
imprisonment that punishes not only the original crime, but the rule 
 
use of day fines in Europe to the resistance to fining in American criminal courts). 
186 Id. at 116. 
187 An example of how punishment on revocation is often much more severe than would 
be expected for the underlying offense conduct comes from a criminal defense lawyer, who 
described a case she handled on post-conviction review several years ago.  “David” was a 
seventeen-year-old homeless high school student who had consensual sex with his fifteen-
year-old girlfriend, a felony offense in a state where the age of consent is eighteen, and 
minors are tried as adults at age seventeen.  Interview with Mary Prosser, Attorney, Frank J. 
Remington Ctr., in Madison, Wis. (Mar. 4, 2013).  He was convicted of second-degree 
sexual assault (a strict liability offense) and sentenced to five years’ probation, with the 
sentence withheld.  David liked to talk back to authority figures, and he did not get along 
well with his probation agent.  One year into his period of supervision, David’s probation 
was revoked for three rule violations: he was “verbally argumentative,” and condoms and 
alcohol were found in the room he shared with another young man.  He denied they were his.  
Upon revocation, he was sentenced to nine years in prison and seven years of post-release 
supervision, and he was ordered to register as a sex offender for the period of post-release 
supervision.  Id. 
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violations that follow, even when the rules themselves  have little to do with 
public safety.  In such instances, it may be more honest (and, incidentally, 
more frugal) to impose a deserved term of confinement from the start. 
While this approach may at first seem less humane than offering a 
community-based sanction, which at least holds out the possibility of 
avoiding imprisonment, it is helpful to remember that studies have 
repeatedly shown that a significant number of individuals with experience 
in the criminal justice system prefer short custodial sentences to longer 
periods of community supervision.188  Offenders often find community 
supervision difficult and tend to rank alternatives to incarceration as more 
punitive than judges, correctional officers, or the general public believe 
them to be.189  This is usually because offenders find it difficult to meet the 
expectations of their agents: not only must they avoid further criminal 
activity, but they must also secure employment, avoid drugs and alcohol, 
attend treatment, and make it to regular meetings with their agents.  Even 
when an offender has succeeded in meeting expectations for a period of 
time, any mistake can result in revocation, and the experience of 
imprisonment on top of the completed portion of community supervision.  
For those offenders who, by virtue of cognitive or psychological 
limitations, personality traits, or force of habit are unable to comply with 
rules of supervision, a short term of confinement is a better, more 
immediate punishment than probation as a prolonged and certain prelude to 
later revocation.  
Just as probation should not be the default disposition when prison is 
not required, post-release supervision should not be imposed in cases where 
it does not serve a readily identifiable public safety interest.  Often, post-
release supervision is imposed on offenders for whom surveillance makes 
little sense.  For minor felons, one-time serious offenders, and those for 
whom age, health, or other personal attributes make recidivism unlikely, 
state supervision serves little purpose other than to impose the “contingent 
liability” of future incarceration.190  This fact has not gone unnoticed by 
those on the ground.  The former commissioner of corrections for New 
York City, Martin Horn, has advocated abolishing post-release supervision 
entirely and instead providing individuals leaving prison with vouchers for 
needed transitional services.191  Scott-Hayward has advocated for abolition 
 
188 See DAVID C. MAY & PETER B. WOOD, RANKING CORRECTIONAL PUNISHMENTS: 
VIEWS FROM OFFENDERS, PRACTITIONERS, AND THE PUBLIC 43–46 (2010). 
189 Id. at 97–102. 
190 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 442 (post-release supervision may impede 
efforts at successful reentry). 
191 Martin F. Horn, Rethinking Sentencing, 5 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 34, 38 (2001). 
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of post-release supervision, arguing that, at least in the case of lower-risk 
offenders, it has outlived its usefulness.192  The “principled minimalist” 
position193 taken by Horn and Scott-Hayward is consistent with the 
evidence suggesting that post-release supervision does not accomplish its 
intended purposes in many cases: it does not prevent reoffense, and it 
delivers transitional services poorly at the cost of subjecting ex-prisoners to 
the constant spectre of possible revocation. 
Saying that probation and post-release supervision should be limited is 
not to say that they serve no important function in the criminal justice 
system.  When an individual does not need to be imprisoned either because 
of the seriousness of her offense or the system’s inability to contain her risk 
of reoffense in a community-based setting, but does require medical or 
social services to reduce that risk and needs formal oversight while 
committing to a law-abiding life in the community, then probation may be 
an appropriate disposition. Similarly, when an offender has been 
incarcerated for a long time or has a particularly violent history and is likely 
to have a difficult period of readjustment to community life, a term of post-
release supervision is appropriate. 
B. LIMITING RELEASE CONDITIONS 
When terms of probation or post-release supervision serve a plausible 
purpose, they should still be “limited” in terms of how much they restrict 
the freedom of those under supervision.  Just as it is true that terms of 
conditional release cannot be revoked for those not serving them, release 
conditions that are not imposed cannot be violated.  Conditions of release 
should be applied parsimoniously and never as a matter of course.194 
As discussed above,195 in almost all jurisdictions, boilerplate 
conditions are imposed on individuals placed on probation or post-release 
supervision.  Some of these conditions are sensible and obvious: “Don’t 
commit new crimes.”  “Keep your supervision agent aware of how to 
contact you.”  Directives like these spell out the basic requirements for 
allowing legitimate supervision to occur safely in the community.  But 
boilerplate conditions are not limited to the fundamentals.  Many agencies 
 
192 Scott-Hayward, supra note 51, at 460, 464. 
193 WALTER J. DICKEY & MICHAEL E. SMITH, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, RETHINKING PROBATION: COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, COMMUNITY SAFETY 32–33 
(1998) (describing Horn’s position as “principled minimalism”). 
194 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.09(8) (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 2013) 
(“Conditions should be attached sparingly, and not as a matter of routine.”). 
195 See supra Part III.A.  
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routinely require individuals under supervision to abstain from alcohol,  
comply with travel restrictions, seek agent permission before getting a new 
job, changing residences, etc.  While these restrictions may be relevant to 
public safety concerns in some cases, in many others they have no nexus to 
the individual’s criminal propensities and may serve as an impediment to 
the successful completion of supervision.  Although agent discretion may 
prevent revocation in cases of minor violations that do not pose a risk to the 
public, the exercise of wise discretion is never guaranteed.  In a world 
where risk aversion defines supervisory practices in many jurisdictions,196 
allowing boilerplate rules to be imposed on probationers and parolees 
creates conditions in which costly and unnecessary revocation can occur. 
With appreciation for the fact that violation of any condition imposed 
may later serve as a ground for imprisonment, legislatures should limit the 
number and kind of conditions that are required in every case, and courts 
and community corrections officials should ensure that all discretionary 
conditions imposed on offenders relate directly to their risk of criminal 
reoffense.  While a recovering alcoholic convicted of operating a motor 
vehicle when he is intoxicated might reasonably be subjected to a ban on 
alcohol consumption, a young burglar with no history of alcohol-related 
crime should not.  Similarly, while treatment conditions designed to reduce 
risks that are closely associated with past criminal offending are properly 
the subject of a community supervision order, therapy that is intended 
merely to better the life prospects of a person under supervision should not 
be made a condition of release.197  While benevolent in its intention, such a 
condition imposes too high a potential price on the person subject to its 
requirements.198  By eliminating conditions that do not bear directly on an 
offender’s criminal rehabilitation and risk of harm to the community, courts 
and correctional agents prevent minor, unimportant conditions from serving 
as grounds for later revocation. 
 
196 See supra Part III.B. 
197 Supervising agencies should make social services available to their clients as 
appropriate and work as brokers to connect clients (and, as appropriate, their families) to 
community resources.  Except insofar as they bear a direct connection to criminal reoffense, 
accessing those services should not, however, be made a condition of release. 
198 Limiting the ability of courts and correctional agencies to require individuals to “better 
themselves” in ways that are not linked to clearly identified risks of criminal offense is 
consistent with recent federal case law limiting judges’ ability to impose lengthy custodial 
sentences for the sole purpose of ensuring that prisoners gain access to prison-based 
rehabilitative programs.  See Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011) (holding that 
it is error for a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete 
a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation”).  In either circumstance, an 
individual should not be required, on pain of potential or certain imprisonment, to do more than 
pay for past wrongdoing and to comply with the law in the future.  
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C. LIMITING TERMS OF SUPERVISION  
In addition to limiting the imposition of community supervision to 
proper candidates and to limiting the condition imposed on those offenders, 
legislatures, courts, and correctional officers should take steps to limit the 
length of time individuals spend under correctional supervision.  Recent 
trends have extended periods of probation and post-release supervision far 
beyond the months and years that immediately follow conviction or release 
from prison.  In many states, periods of community supervision can now 
last for ten or twenty years, or even for a lifetime.199  Such lengthy periods 
of supervision serve little purpose other than to provide almost unlimited 
opportunity for violations and revocation.  Shortening terms of probation 
and post-release community supervision keeps supervision focused on 
reducing the risk of reoffense in the period of time during which reoffense 
is most likely to occur; that is, in the months and years immediately 
following conviction or release from prison.200 
One reason to favor lengthy community sentences is that they provide 
a measure of guaranteed state oversight of individuals known, by virtue of 
their past convictions, to pose a heightened risk of criminal reoffense.  
While the argument for increased surveillance and services is strong in the 
first few years following release, it weakens with the passage of time.  For 
all but the riskiest offenders, the surveillance offered by community 
supervision is likely to fail, either by missing signs of new offending or by 
“catching” them committing low-level offenses that do not justify the 
resources their apprehension consumes.  While supervision may sometimes 
result in detection of a serious crime, many serious offenses will be (and 
are) detected through ordinary police activity: there is no evidence to 
suggest that supervision significantly increases the detection of new crimes 
and therefore justifies long-term, ongoing state intervention.  Committing 
significant correctional resources to what is effectively preventive policing 
will often yield little in the way of public safety benefits, while exposing 
the individual under supervision to a significant risk of imprisonment based 
 
199 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 559.106 (West 2006) (lifetime supervision for sex 
offenders); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.1243(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (“Lifetime supervision 
shall be deemed a form of parole . . . .”); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(iv) (amended 
2003) (lifetime probation for certain drug offenses) (repealed and supplemented by MICH. 
STAT. ANN. § 333.7401(4) (2003) (recommending no more than five years of probation for 
individuals previously sentenced to lifetime probation under the abrogated law)). 
200 AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., PUTTING PUBLIC SAFETY FIRST: 13 PAROLE 
SUPERVISION STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE REENTRY OUTCOMES 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411791_public_safety_first.pdf. 
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on violations of the conditions of release—violations whose detection 
becomes increasingly likely over time. 
A second justification often given for terms of supervision is the need 
to collect restitution, fines, and fees from convicted individuals, who often 
take many years to satisfy their financial obligations.201  Extending terms of 
community supervision for the sole purpose of collecting money that the 
offender has already been ordered to pay is a practice that is difficult to 
justify.  Almost by definition, such practices impose greater burdens on 
poor offenders than on wealthy ones and may well expend more resources 
on supervision than they collect in payments.  It is important to order and 
collect restitution; however, other measures, such as civil judgment or 
contempt, could be used to ensure that restitution is paid without requiring 
extended terms of probation or post-release supervision with their attendant 
risk of revocation.202 
The easiest way to limit terms of supervision is to reduce the statutory 
maximum period of supervision provided by law, thereby limiting the 
ability of sentencing judges and correctional agencies to impose lengthy 
terms of community supervision.  A second way is to authorize judges or 
correctional agents to shorten the community sentences of individuals who 
have demonstrated compliance for a designated period of time.  In recent 
years, states such as Colorado, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Texas 
have passed laws and adopted policies expanding the practice of early 
termination.203  In 2003, the federal Judicial Conference, whose judges have 
long-possessed the power to terminate supervision early, adopted formal 
guidelines to assist probation agents in identifying candidates for early 
termination.204 
 
201 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-902(C) (2010) (authorizing an extension of 
probation for five years beyond the otherwise maximum sentence if “the court has 
required . . . that the defendant make restitution” and the “condition has not been satisfied” at 
the end of the probation). 
202 A good analogy here might be to child support enforcement procedures, which often 
make use of garnishment and other civil remedies to ensure collection. 
203 PORTER, supra note 153, at 11, 14–15; see also MIKE MCALISTER, N.H. DEP’T OF 
CORR. POLICY & PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE, ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS STATEMENT NO. 5.64, 
EARLY TERMINATION FROM PROBATION/PAROLE SUPERVISION 1 (Mar. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/documents/5-64.pdf (requiring that probation and parole cases be 
reviewed for early termination at least once a year). 
204 Press Release, The Third Branch, Good Behavior Rewarded (Mar. 2004), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/04-03-01/Good_Behavior_Rewarded.aspx.  
The release identified the following criteria as grounds for early termination: 
 stable community reintegration (e.g., residence, family, employment); 
 progressive strides toward supervision objectives and in compliance with all conditions of 
supervision; 
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Early termination has several benefits.  First, it offers an incentive to 
offenders to comply throughout the early course of supervision—a time 
when the risk of reoffense is greatest.205  It also reduces the cost of 
community supervision by shortening sentences and removes the potential 
cost of future imprisonment by reducing the period of time in which an 
offender is subject to supervision and the possibility of revocation.  It is 
also a politically palatable option: unlike early prison release legislation, 
which has met with considerable political opposition,206 early termination 
laws have not been the subject of significant political debate. 
The challenge to implementing early termination laws is more 
practical than political.  Most statutes rely on community corrections agents 
to “nominate” candidates for early release and to end supervision early, 
either through adminstrative action or by petitioning the sentencing court.207  
The difficulty with this approach is that it requires agents to terminate their 
most compliant clients.  Because most officers carry heavy caseloads and 
deal with many individuals who have great needs and difficulty complying 
with release conditions,208 there are many subconscious incentives to avoid 
early termination.  To encourage the use of early termination, laws should 
make termination presumptive after a sustained period of compliance. 
 
 no aggravated role in the offense of conviction, particularly large drug or fraud offenses; 
 no history of violence (e.g., sexually assaultive, predatory behavior, or domestic violence); 
 no recent arrests or convictions (including unresolved pending charges), or ongoing, 
uninterrupted patterns of criminal conduct; 
 no recent evidence of alcohol or drug abuse; 
 no recent psychiatric episodes; 
 no identifiable risk to the safety of any identifiable victim; and 
 no identifiable risk to public safety based on the Risk Prediction Index. 
205 SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 200, at 14. 
206 See Klingele, supra note 70, at 441–50. 
207 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 27.4(a) (“At any time during the term of probation, upon 
motion of the probation officer or on its own initiative, the court, after notifying the 
prosecutor, may terminate probation and discharge the probationer absolutely as provided by 
law.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.04(3) (West 2004) (“If the probationer has performed 
satisfactorily, has not been found in violation of any terms or conditions of supervision, and 
has met all financial sanctions imposed by the court, including, but not limited to, fines, 
court costs, and restitution, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination 
of probation to the court at any time before the scheduled termination date.”). 
208 Matthew DeMichele & Brian K. Payne, Probation and Parole Officers Speak Out—
Caseload and Workload Allocation, 71 FED. PROBATION 30, 30 (2007); see also Jason Clark-
Miller & Kelli D. Stevens, Effective Supervision Strategies: Do Frequent Changes of 
Supervision Officers Affect Probationer Outcomes?, 75 FED. PROBATION 11, 11 (2011) 
(“Caseload size has long been a concern of community corrections officials and researchers 
with regard to effective management of offenders in the community . . . .”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Sentences of community supervision serve important purposes: they 
allow people who have been convicted of crimes to access community 
resources to address underlying criminogenic needs, and they provide a 
community-based forum for accountability and oversight.  They also carry 
with them the constant threat of imprisonment—a threat that is realized in a 
significant number of cases. 
Creating revocation guidelines and limiting the kinds of behaviors that 
can result in returning to prison are important developments in the battle to 
reduce unnecessary revocation.  They do not, however, address many of the 
fundamental problems that lead to revocation, which can be described as 
too many rules, placed on too many people, for far too long.  Many 
individuals currently serving sentences of community supervision could be 
punished in other nonconditional and noncustodial ways.  Others could be 
subjected to far fewer rules and supervised for far less time while posing no 
greater threat to public safety. 
As legal reformers continue their efforts to reduce prison populations, 
they would do well to rethink the role of community supervision in efforts 
to reduce overreliance on prison.  By limiting the use, duration, and 
conditions of probation and post-release supervision, lawmakers can 
succeed in reducing unnecessary revocation while also ensuring the 
continued legitimacy of community sanctions. 
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Sanctions Sanctions Mandatory Sanction 
Warning ticket-PO Warning ticket-PO Detain for hearing in Custody-PS 
Increase urine testing-PO Increase urine testing-PO   
Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO Increase visit/contacts for up to 30 days-PO   
Curfew (up to 14 days-PO, up to 30 days-PS) Curfew (up to 14 days-PO, up to 30 days-PS)   
Supervisor’s conference Supervisor’s conference   
  (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   
Increase level of supervision Increase level of supervision   
  (formal change in level)-PS   (formal change in level)-PS   
Community service-PS Community service-PS   
Electronic monitoring Electronic monitoring   
  (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD)   (up to 30 days-PS; over 30 days)-BD   
Formal warning from the Board (90 days)-BD Formal warning from the Board (90 days)-BD  
Final warning from the Board (180 days)-BD Final warning from the Board (180 days)-BD  
Halfway back Halfway back  
 (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD)  (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD)   
Hearing on the street-PS Hearing on the street-PS   
Detain for hearing in custody with Detain for hearing in custody with   
treatment recommendation-PS treatment recommendation-PS   
Detain for hearing in custody-PS Detain for hearing in custody-PS   
Interventions Interventions   
Assessment by SAC-PO Assessment by SAC-PO   
Attend AA/NA-PO Attend AA/NA-PO   
Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO   
Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO   
Attend Employment Services-PO Attend Employment Services-PO   
OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO   
Attend residential treatment-PS Attend residential treatment-PS   






Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions 
Warning ticket-PO Warning ticket-PO Warning ticket-PO 
Increase urine testing-PO Increase urine testing-PO Increase urine testing-PO 
Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO 
Curfew (up to 14 days)-PO Curfew (up to 14 days-PO; up to 30 days-PS) Curfew (up to 14 days-PO; up to 30 days-PS) 
Supervisor’s conference Supervisor’s conference Supervisor’s conference 
  (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal 
change)-PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal change)-
PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal 
change)-PS 
Community service-PS Community service-PS Community service-PS 
  Electronic monitoring Electronic monitoring 
    (up to 30 days-PS; over 30 days)-BD   (up to 30 days-PS; over 90 days)-BD 
  Formal warning from the Board (90 days)-BD Formal warning from the Board (90 days)-BD 
  Final warning from the Board (180)-BD Final warning from the Board (180)-BD 
  Halfway back Halfway back 
    (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD)   (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD) 
  Hearing on the street-PS Hearing on the street-PS 
  Interventions Interventions 
Interventions Assessment by SAC-PO Assessment by SAC-PO 
Assessment by SAC-PO Attend AA/NA-PO Attend AA/NA-PO 
Attend AA/NA-PO Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO 
Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO 
Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO Attend employment services-PO Attend employment services-PO 
Attend employment services-PO OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO 
OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO Attend residential treatment-PS Attend residential treatment-PS 
Attend residential treatment-PS OCC Level IV-BD OCC Level IV-BD 
  
Low Medium High 
  
VIOLATION SEVERITY 




209 Graduated Sanctions Guideline Grid, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/
pb/grad-sanctions-grid.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 








Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions 
Warning ticket-PO Warning ticket-PO Warning ticket-PO 
Increase urine testing-PO Increase urine testing-PO Increase urine testing-PO 
Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO Increase visits/contacts for up to 30 days-PO 
Curfew (up to 14 days)-PO Curfew (up to 14 days)-PO Curfew (up to 14 days-PO; up to 30 days-PS) 
Supervisor’s conference Supervisor’s conference Supervisor’s conference 
  (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS   (formal conf. w./PS, PO and/or Parolee)-PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal 
change)-PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal change)-
PS 
Increase level of supervision (formal 
change)-PS 
Community service-PS Community service-PS Community service-PS 
  Electronic monitoring (up to 30 days)-PS Electronic monitoring 
      (up to 30 days-PS; over 30 days)-BD 
    Formal warning from the Board (90 days)-BD 
    Final warning from the Board (180 days)-BD 
    Halfway back 
      (up to 90 days-PS; over 90 days-BD) 
    Hearing on the street-PS 
    Detain for hearing in custody with 
      treatment recommendation-PS 
    Detain for hearing in custody-PS 
Interventions Interventions Interventions 
Assessment by SAC-PO Assessment by SAC-PO Assessment by SAC-PO 
Attend AA/NA-PO Attend AA/NA-PO Attend AA/NA-PO 
Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO Attend outpatient drug treatment-PO 
Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO Attend other evaluation and counseling-PO 
Attend employment services-PO Attend employment services-PO Attend employment services-PO 
OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO OCC Level II or III (without ELMO)-PO 
Attend residential treatment-PS Attend residential treatment-PS Attend residential treatment-PS 
 
 
Low Medium High 
 VIOLATION SEVERITY 
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Appendix 2 
Minnesota Guidelines for Revocation of Parole/Supervised Release210 
Release Condition Severity Level  Proposed Disposition 
  SEVERITY LEVEL I 
 1. If restitution is ordered as part of the sentence, the offender will make 
payments as directed by agent/designee. 
Absent multiple or 
aggravating factors, the 
presumptive disposition 
is to restructure with 
new or modified 
condition(s) 
 
If revoked due to 
aggravating factors, the 
presumptive return time 
is for a minimum of 60 
days. 
2. The offender will submit at any time to unannounced visit and/or search 
of the offender’s person, vehicle or premises by the agent/designee. 
3. An offender will not leave the state of Minnesota without written 
approval from the agent/designee, and then only under the terms and 
conditions as prescribed in writing.  (The offender has left and returned to 
the state). 
 
 SEVERITY LEVEL II 
 1. The offender will maintain contact with the agent/designee as directed 
and respond promptly to any communication regarding release. 
Absent any aggravating 
factors, the 
presumptive decision is 
to restructure 
with new or modified 
conditions. 
 
If revoked due to an 
aggravated factor(s) the 
presumptive return time 
is for a minimum of 90 
days. 
2. The offender will at all times follow the instructions of the 
agent/designee. 
3. The offender must reside at the approved residence and may not change 
residence until approved by the agent/designee.  The offender will keep 
the agent/designee informed of his/her activities.  Daily activities must be 
constructive and include those designed to obtain/maintain employment 
and/or attend a treatment or education program as directed by 
agent/designee. 
4. The offender will inform the agent/designee either by direct or indirect 
contact, within 24 hours of any court appearance and/or contact with law 
enforcement 
5. The offender will refrain from the use or possession of intoxicants and 
will not use or possess narcotics, alcohol, or other drugs, preparations, or 
substances as defined by Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 152, except those 
prescribed for the offender by a licensed physician or approved by the 
agent/designee. The offender will not possess or allow in his/her residence 
any drug paraphernalia or mood-altering substances not prescribed by a 
physician. The offender will submit to breathalyzer, urinalysis, and/or 
other DOC approved methods of chemical analyses, directed by the 
agent/designee. 
6. Conviction of any misdemeanor. 




210 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., REVIEW OF GUIDELINES FOR REVOCATION OF PAROLE AND 
SUPERVISED RELEASE: 2009 REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 27 app.A (2009). 




SEVERITY LEVEL III 
 1. Conviction of any gross misdemeanor. Absent any mitigating 
factors, the 
presumptive decision is 
to revoke. 
 
If revoked, the 
presumptive return time 
is for a minimum of 120 
days. 
2. For non-ISR offenders, violation of any special condition(s) of release. 
3. Violation of any condition(s) of a restructured release form. 
4. Subsequent violation of Level II condition(s). 
  SEVERITY LEVEL IV 
 1. For ISR offenders, violation of any special condition(s) of release. Absent multiple and/or 
significant 
circumstances, the 




If revoked, presumptive 
return time is for a 
minimum of 150 days, 
if 180 days or more, 
disposition must include 
a determination of Risk 




2. Conviction of any felony. 
3. The offender must go directly to the residence specified and report to 
the agent/designee by telephone or by personal visit within 24 hours of 
release or as specifically directed by the agent/designee. 
4. The offender is apprehended out of state and is out of state without 
agent/designee written approval. (Transport was required to return 
offender to the state). 
5. The offender will not engage in any assaultive, abusive or violent 
behavior, including harassment, stalking or threats of violence. 
6. The offender will not have direct or indirect contact with victim(s) of 
current or previous offenses without prior documented approval of 
agent/designee. 
7. The offender must not purchase or otherwise obtain or have in 
possession any type of firearm or dangerous weapon. 
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